


# REALITY

SPRING, 1954

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VOL. IV SPRING, 1954 NO. 2

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REALITY is published twice yearly by the student brothers of the Dominican Province of St. Albert the Great. Intended primarily for circulation within the Dominican Order, REALITY'S articles are largely the result of work done by the students within the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy, River Forest, Illinois, and the General Studium of Theology, Dubuque, Iowa.

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*cum permissu superiorum*

*God, the Highest Truth, has created and guides human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones but rather that having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth.*

Pius XII

*Encyclical Humani Generis*

# THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

**THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE** is forgotten or smiled at by many today. Modern scientists despair of ever acquiring such knowledge of reality as Aristotle demanded for science. Yet Aristotle's requirements for scientific knowledge were based upon a profound penetration of reality and the nature and capacity of the human intellect. He realized that the material universe is composed of many distinct individuals which are continually subject to change, generation and decay. Yet there is something about each type which transcends change and time, something intrinsic which is necessary and unchanging. This is the root structure which makes the individual to be what it is, which constitutes it in a determined species.

This intrinsic radical make-up we call the essence of the thing. It is unchanging and necessary and cannot be other than it is. This would imply a contradiction, for if it were other, the thing would not be what it is. If man could be other than rational animal, he would not be man. The essence is the cause of the essential properties and specific operations of a thing. These properties and operations are, as it were, the outward manifestation of the inner nature or essence of the thing itself. They necessarily inhere in their subject and are known to be essential by their characteristic regularity. Viewed as the cause of these properties and operations, the essence is called the nature of the thing. Hence, types which make up this changing universe have something intrinsic which is necessary and unchanging, their essential natures. Moreover, the essential nature is the cause of properties, operations and effects which are also necessary and essential. This necessity and causal relation on the part of reality is the objective foundation for the Aristotelian notion of science.

But what of man's capacity to know? Man by nature is a rational animal, that is, he differs from all the other animals in that he apprehends

things, judges about them and reasons. The faculty or power by which man is able to perform these operations is his intellect. That which is primarily and essentially known, as the proper object of his intellect, is the essence of a material thing as it is universal and abstracted from the particular features of the individual. Man does this by distinguishing what is essential and necessary from those aspects of the thing which are accidental and contingent. For example, in coming to an essential knowledge of man, he first leaves out all of the characteristics which make individual men differ from one another, such as their peculiar height or weight, the color of their eyes, shape of their heads, and so forth. Having abstracted from the individuating notes and having arrived at something common, he next distinguishes the accidental from the essential and necessary. Man can exist and live without hands, arms, legs, or hair; but to live and operate as a man he needs a head, heart, nervous system, systems of nutrition, respiration and circulation, internal and external senses, sense appetites, reason and free will. These organs in their operations manifest the essential nature of man. Reason and free will are proper to man alone; the other characteristics he has in common with the animals. A man must be a rational animal. It is somewhat in this manner that man would come to a knowledge of his own essential nature.

Thus, man knows the essences of material things not by direct intuition but by orderly apprehending them through their sensible properties and operations. From these apprehensions he can make judgments and reason to the conclusion that the essential nature of this thing is the proper and immediate cause of its essential properties and effects. He can know this with certitude, for the essence of a thing cannot be other than it is, and necessary effects have necessary causes. This conclusion, that a subject has this property because of its essential nature or cause, is what Aristotle meant by scientific knowledge in the strictest sense of the term.

Aristotle defines science as the knowledge of the cause upon which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and further, that the fact could not be other than it is.[1] Now these three conditions are perfectly fulfilled when we know that the essential nature of a subject is the cause of its essential properties and effects. We have the knowledge of a cause because the essence is the cause of its specific properties and effects. It is the proper and appropriate cause because the property or effect is essential and commensurately universal with its subject; it belongs essentially, primarily, and to any instance of the subject. Finally, the fact cannot be otherwise because it is founded upon the real objective being and truth of the thing. If it could be otherwise, the thing

[1] Aristotle, *Past. Analyt.* (ed. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle;* New York: Random House, 1941), I, ch. 2, 71b, 10-11.

would not be what it is. Man by nature is a rational animal; if he could be other than rational, he would not be man.

Saint Thomas states that Aristotle demands these three conditions for perfect, actual, and certain knowledge.[2] In perfect knowledge the causes of the thing known are also the causes of the knowledge of the thing. To conclude to the existence of a thing from its effects is to have an imperfect knowledge, for in this case the effects of the thing known are causes of our knowledge of the thing. From motion we arrive at the existence of a first unmoved mover. Motion is the effect of this unmoved mover, but it is also the cause of our knowledge of the mover's existence. Therefore, to have perfect knowledge we must know the cause of the thing known. But if we know only the cause and not the effect in act, our knowledge of the causal connection is only virtual. Consequently, for an actual knowledge we must know the application of the cause to its effect. With the third condition, certitude in our knowledge is realized because the object of scientific knowledge must be such that it cannot be otherwise. Science must be concerned with necessary and essential matter.

For science, for a perfect, actual, and certain knowledge, we must know the cause, the proper and appropriate cause, and the object of study must be necessary and essential. Let us consider each of these points in detail, and first of all view the necessary and essential matter required for science. It is obvious why Aristotle demands an object which cannot be otherwise. In a universe in which everything is constantly undergoing change, only such an object would be worthwhile knowing. Only such an object would produce a firm knowledge and put the human mind at rest. But is there anything in reality which can produce this certain knowledge? And if there is, how can the human mind be certain of this; what would be its criterion for judging?

From a study of natural things the human mind can ascertain that there is something about them which is stable and necessary. In spite of the multitude of individuals, we know from experience that many of them, human beings for example, are very similar to each other in their actions and appearances, and are types of the same class or group. Other individuals, as the horse or robin, manifest typical and regular properties and functions which are abruptly distinct and are types of different groups. We find that there are many different groups or species not only among animals and plants, but also among non-living things, compounds and elements. Now each definite and stable type in the world requires some sufficient intrinsic reason to explain its stability and regularity. This intrinsic radical make-up of the thing which is the cause of the characteristic properties and operations is the essential nature. The essence is precisely what the thing is. The nature is the essence insofar as it is

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[2] Saint Thomas, *In Post. Analyt.* (ed. Leonina, vol. I, *Opera Omnia, Rome:* Typ. Poly., 1882), I, lect. IV.

the cause of the essential properties, operations and effects. It is the essential nature of a thing which allows us to connect and explain its characteristic and regular features. It is the essential nature which transcends change and the accidental and contingent differences of individuals. Finally, the essential nature is something which cannot be other than it is and is therefore an object worthy of scientific study

The essential nature or essence, however, can be considered in three ways. As it exists in natural things it is individuated and rendered incommunicable. As it exists formally in the mind, it is abstracted from its individuating subjects and is known as universal and predicable of these subjects. Thirdly, it can be considered in itself, (*secundum se*), i.e., as precised by the mind and separated from anything that is not a part of the essence itself. Viewed in this way the essential natures are immobile and intelligible in themselves, and they are the principles and the causes of the being and the understanding of particular things. The primary object of science is the essence or nature in itself, (*secundum se*), not as singular nor as formally universal.

But what criterion do we have for judging that an essential nature cannot be other than it is? We must judge this by the principle that is the most certain and the most firm, a principle which cannot be doubted. This can only be the fundamental law of *being* and of *knowledge*. This is the principle of contradiction: being is not non-being; this is not that. By the principle of contradiction and with the help of sensory experience, all the truths of science and philosophy are attained, and by the principle of contradiction they are finally judged and known to be true. Without this principle science is impossible.

In the light of this principle, can the essential nature of a thing be other than it is? Obviously not; for the essence is precisely what the thing is. If it could be other than it is, it would not be what it is. It would be what it is and at the same time and under the same aspect what it is not. Man would be a rational animal and at the same time and under the same aspect not a rational animal. But this is impossible; it violates the principle of contradiction. Man is what he is, a rational animal, and he cannot be otherwise. The essential nature makes a thing to be what it is and it cannot be other than it is. It is true that the necessity involved here is hypothetical, but it suffices for science. It is called hypothetical because the subject need not necessarily exist nor be what it is. But supposing that the subject does exist, it cannot at once not exist; and supposing that the subject is this, i.e., has this nature, it cannot at once not be this. Hence we see that the world is composed of individuals which are grouped into different species because of their essential natures. Moreover, these essential natures are the cause of necessity, as also of universality, and make scientific knowledge possible.

Besides the essential nature of a subject there are also properties or attributes which are essential and necessarily connected with their sub-

ject. They may be of three kinds: (1) such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature; (2) such as contain their subject in their own definition; (3) such as are consequentially connected with their subject, as an effect which has a necessary connection with its cause.[3] The first type of property is either a part of the essential nature of the subject or belongs to the subject because of its very nature. Such attributes are the metaphysical attributes of the subject, i.e., they are not really distinct from the subject. In this way radical extension or location is part of the essential nature of the mobile, and radical risibility belongs to the very essence of man.

The second kind of property exists when a subject is placed in the definition of its property, not as its essential contitutive, but as its material cause and its proper subject. Thus the mobile is placed in the definition of motion. Physical properties belong to this type of attribute. They are really distinct from their subject, and some of them can be impeded or separated from the subject, e.g., the hand can be cut off. Finally, an essential property or attribute may be connected with its subject as an effect which necessarily depends upon its cause, and this not only as efficient, but also as final, formal, or material cause. Examples of this type of connection are common in physical science. The circulation of the blood is an effect which necessarily depends upon the movement of the heart as upon its efficient cause. The generation of copper oxide is an effect, the proper cause of which must be the chemical affinity of copper (Cu) and oxygen (O). Oxygen and copper are the remote material causes of this compound, while their chemical affinity is the reason for their reaction, by which the matter is proximately disposed for the new form. Hence we see that essential natures and essential properties, which may be of three kinds, have a necessity and are objects worthy of scientific study.

Another requirement of Aristotle for scientific knowledge is that we know the cause of the fact. Now we have seen that there are two facts which cannot be otherwise, namely, the essential natures of things and their essential properties. Therefore, the question arises, of which of these two facts can we know the cause? Concerning the essential nature of a subject we can arrive at a knowledge of what it is (*quid sit*). But what about the reason why it is, that is, its cause (*propter quid*)? To attempt to find this we would have to use the subject and its essential nature as an effect and conclude to the existence of a sufficient cause for it, without, however, knowing the nature of that cause. In this case we would not have perfect science, for we would not know the nature of the cause as it is the cause of its effect. But with regard to our second possibility, namely that a subject has this essential property (*quia sit*), we can know the cause or reason why (*propter quid*) and this in three ways. If the property pertains to the very essence or definition of the subject,

[3] Aristotle, *Post. Analyt.*, I, ch. 4, 73a, 34–73b, 4; 73b, 10-15.

we know its cause when we know the essential nature of the subject. Secondly, if the essence or definition of the property contains its subject, we know the cause of the property when we know the nature of the subject as the proper material cause of that property. With respect to a subject and its physical properties it is possible to reason *propter quid* either from the subject to the property or from the property to the subject. For example, motion is the act of the mobile (property to subject); the mobile is extended in place and time (subject to property). Finally, if the property is a necessary effect, we know its cause when we know its proper matter or form, agent or end. Here again there is a hypothetical necessity on the part of the object. If this form or end is to be, then this matter or these means are necessary, for the end is the reason for the means (including the action of the agent) and the action of the agent is the reason for the actualizing of the matter. The matter is for the form, to receive it and support it in being; the form is the reason for the specification of the matter.

Aristotle's remaining qualification for scientific knowledge is that we know the cause as it is the cause of that fact and of no other, that is, that we know the proper and proximate cause. We know this only when the property or effect is commensurately universal with its subject or cause. A property is commensurately universal when it belongs to every instance of its subject essentially and primarily, when it can be shown to belong to any random instance of its subject, and when the subject is the first thing to which it can be shown to belong. Thus, motion belongs essentially to the mobile, and the mobile is the primary and proper subject of motion. Likewise, the circulation of the blood is caused properly and primarily by the movement of the heart, although the contraction and pulsation of the veins are auxiliary aids to circulation.

From this analysis of Aristotles' definition of scientific knowledge we have seen that perfect science is concerned with essential and necessary matter, and seeks the knowledge of a proper and appropriate cause. Moreover, this essential and causal connection can exist between a subject and its property, a property and its proper subject, and a cause and its effect. This perfect science, however, does not exclude what Aristotle calls *quia* science. To proceed from an effect to its cause or from a prior or remote cause to an effect is to have scientific knowledge of a less perfect kind. Nor must the methods and tools of a science be overlooked. Dialectics, induction, experimentation, observation, and measurement are both useful for and necessary to the science of nature. Yet all these are ordained to a more precise knowledge of the natures, operations and causes of things, to a perfect knowledge of them. This is the ideal. Its realization is difficult but not impossible.

Stanislaus Gorski, O.P.

# THE PERFECTION OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE

**IN HIS WORKS ON LOGIC** Aristotle forged a powerful tool for the achievement of scientific knowledge. And lest this logical method remain sterile, he applied it to the sensible world of his experience and found in changeable things necessary principles and causes. A scientific study of nature was possible, for sensible change could be understood in the light of its proper principles and causes.

The true *beginning* in the science of nature has come down to us through the ages, from Aristotle to Saint Thomas and the great Commentators. But what is the perfection of this science? Do we find in Aristotle and Saint Thomas, or for that matter anywhere at all, the perfection necessary for a complete science?

All who have truly seen the meaning of the vast science of changeable things will admit that the end has not been reached. In all probability it will never be reached for the ultimate perfection can only consist in an exhaustive knowledge of the ultimate species of things.

Saint Thomas is very explicit on this point in the first part of his commentary on the *Meteorology*. He states that a science in the universal aspect alone is incomplete. Such a knowledge is neither in pure potency nor in final act. We may know man as an animal but the richness and perfection of perfect knowledge is lacking until we grasp the constitutive difference of the species. It is manifest, therefore, that the completion of natural science cannot rest in a general treatment but must extend from the more universal to the ultimate species.

Our intention is to show how the facts uncovered by modern research in one simple case, the problem of solutions in Chemistry, can be organized and understood to admit true demonstrations. What can be done in this field is possible to a greater or lesser extent in all the branches of physical science. Many facts have been brought to light about the ultimate species. They are waiting and begging to be understood.

One of the first things a young chemist working in his laboratory realizes is the usefulness of solutions as a factor in change. The storerooms are lined with shelves which contain reagents, usually in solution, and the great majority of experimentation proceeds with materials in this same state.

The regularity of this fact is almost astounding. Reactions which could be violent in the gaseous state are easily performed by means of solutions. Reactions which would be difficult or impossible between solids are also readily carried out. Rust and corrosion always take place more easily in a damp condition because the moisture itself contains oxygen and other dissolved gases and minerals. Solutions, because of their suitability for speedy and determined change, are used in qualitative analysis. This use is not something accidental, but is a regular and most adaptable means of aiding reaction.

In living things the regularity is even more evident since most of the necessary processes of growth and nutrition require such solutions. The oak tree sending its roots into the soil finds more than moisture. In the water which it absorbs are many minerals and compounds needed for life. In solution these compounds are carried from the roots to every branch and leaf. In man, the blood transports oxygen and food products from one part of the body to another in solution form. The multiple change which takes place in each cell requires dissolved materials. In all these examples, regardless of the great differences, one fact remains regular and determined—the purpose of solutions is to promote orderly change.

If change is truly the final cause of solutions, it is necessary to see more than regularity. If a man sees automobiles regularly roll out of a factory, the chances are excellent that the purpose of the factory is to make automobiles. But he may be mistaken. The factory may be a warehouse or the cars may belong to the workmen. He is certain only if he sees the assembly line with all of its operations ordered to the production of automobiles. We must, therefore, view the assembly line of solutions and see them ordered to change.

Solutions are mixtures, but how do they differ from other mixtures? In what state or form are the solutions found? Every mixture is an intermingling of component parts. Hence this question can be answered by finding the possible modes of intermingling.

Substantial change itself is one type of mixture in which the mingling of parts results in a new compound differing in both chemical and physical properties. In a simple mixture between fine sand and water there is no change in either the physical or chemical properties. The sand will settle if allowed to stand, or it can easily be filtered out. In a solution of water and salt the chemical properties of the salt remain the same while the physical properties differ. The solute will not settle, nor can it be filtered. The particles of a simple mixture are comparatively large and

visible to the eye. In a solution, on the other hand, they are small, either in a state of molecular subdivision or in small groups of molecules, and are not visible even with the aid of an ordinary microscope. These examples aid us in understanding the definition of a solution. It is a mixture of substances in a minute or molecular state of subdivision with the chemical properties remaining the same.

There must be some reason for the determined arrangement and intermingling of molecules. In solution, the whole purpose of this minute intermingling of particles is to prepare the way for reaction. All changes require contact of the reagents, and what state offers a better opportunity than the state of molecular subdivision? When two solids are brought together they can react only where the surfaces meet. In solutions the components are joined as separate molecules or groups of molecules and the reaction becomes possible.

Solutions are divided into two large classes according to the division of particles in the mixture. Those are true solutions in which the particles are molecules, ions, or of a molecular magnitude. Those with particles of a larger magnitude are colloidal solutions or dispersions. In the first type the solute actually breaks down into individual molecules or ions, and takes its place in the molecular pattern of the solvent. The difference between a true solution and a colloid is detected only by passing a beam of light through each. The larger particles of the colloid reflect the light. The smaller ones in solution do not reflect and the beam remains invisible.

Experimentation shows that substances with both polar, or both non-polar, molecules are mutually soluble. An attempt to form a solution between two types, however, usually ends in failure.

The polarity of molecules, which is measureable, exerts a marked influence on solvable substances. Polar molecules form a definite pattern with the positive pole of one tending to hang on to the negative pole of the other. This pattern is not something rigid like a drill team, but rather it has that constantly changing activity which resembles the unpredictable behavior of the playground – where children continually run from one playmate to another.

The situation is comparable to a play rehearsal. If the director wishes to accomplish anything, he will not have both actors and stagehands working together. In like manner, non-polar molecules do not work well with polar molecules for they do not have the same general chain-like structure. Separately each type will work smoothly; together they end in failure. The peculiar state proper to true solutions requires in most cases this similarity of particles.

All these facts concerning solutions are directed to, and can be understood in the light of change. The materials used must be both polar and non-polar in order that they may intermingle in a state of molecular sub-

division. Following a more complete study, many other requirements for the raw materials become apparent, each ordered in its own way to the production of the suitable conditions of change. The raw materials enter into a minute or molecular subdivision which brings the particles of the solution into the intimate intermingling state. Immediate contact is obtained between the reagents and a pattern most suitable for reaction is produced. The matter of the solutions, the minute intermingling of parts, and the immediate contact, all receive their reason for being from the end which is the faster, easier, and better achievement of the reaction.

Several demonstrations emerge from this brief examination of solutions. The clearest method of seeing conclusions in the light of the middle term is to set each proof in syllogistic form. All of the demonstrations proceed through the final cause, so care must be taken to interpret them in this manner.

The *sine qua non* conditions of any reaction must be present if the reaction is to take place. Regardless of what these conditions may be, they are necsesary for the agent to act. If the purpose of solutions is reaction, solutions must prepare the suitable conditions for reaction. *Change requires suitable conditions. But solutions facilitate change. Therefore, the solutions provide the suitable conditions.*

Two substances in solution are brought together in immediate contact. No one can deny such an obvious fact, but the reason for this fact produces genuine scientific knowledge. Why do solutions provide better contact of reagents? The answer flows from the previous demonstration — because contact is the necessary condition of change. Many different conditions are required for different reactions, heat, light, catalysts; but the most apparent and necessary condition of change is the contact. If there is to be any reaction, there must be a contact of reagents. *The most suitable condition for change is better contact. But solutions provide the suitable conditions for change. Therefore, solutions provide better contact of reagents.*

The proper reason for the minute or molecular subdivision of substances in the liquid state is the better contact of reagents. *Better contact is had by a state of minute or molecular subdivision. But solutions provide this better contact. Therefore, solutions are in a state of minute or molecular subdivision.*

The final demonstration is seen through the intermingling proper to true solutions in which the substances break down into individual molecules or ions. Present in this state is usually a similarity of molecules, either polar or non-polar. *Molecular subdivision requires similarity of molecules. But true solutions are in a state of molecular subdivision. Therefore, true solutions require similarity of molecules.*

One simple problem in a single branch of science yields four demonstrations with possibilities of many others. Each type of solution can

be analyzed in terms of the proper reaction to which it is ordained. The solubility and insolubility of substances which are manifestly regular demand reasons. There is gold in the mountains of modern research. Each branch of science conceals great riches mingled with the constant increase of facts. Who has the method capable of separating the gold from the useless mud in which it is embedded? Aristotle and Saint Thomas give us the beginning, the method, and the tools, but the completion demands application. Only when the proper techniques are applied to true research can the pure gold of an understanding of nature be found.

Cletus Wessels, O.P.

# ETHICS CAUSALLY

**ORDER IS THE WORK OF THE WISE MAN.** Since the Divine Intelligence created and ordered the universe, man has sought to comprehend the harmony of nature and fashion his own actions upon it. It is this desire for order which leads a man from the investigations of Natural Philosophy into the study of Moral Science. Having witnessed the harmony of the universe, the mind of man seeks to establish a similar order within his own life. To discover this system in the moral life is the purpose of Ethics.

The science of Natural Philosophy is concerned primarily with speculative considerations which the mind witnesses but in no way makes. Moral Science, on the other hand, considers the practical order, man's purpose and the means of attaining it. A study of Ethics is of paramount importance in the process of education, for it establishes the reason both for learning and for life.

While we speak of Moral Science in the singular, there are really three distinct sciences; one which considers individual actions, another actions of the family, and a third the political society. However, for our consideration we need only mention them. The general part of Ethics which we will speak of here is common to all three sciences.

Before proceeding, let it be understood that we are treating of Moral Philosophy, not Moral Theology. Viewed strictly from a natural level, the goal of which we speak will always be imperfect, since it falls short of eternal glory. Nevertheless, such a discussion is not useless. Though God has gratuitously supplied man with a supernatural end and the grace to obtain it, yet He works through the nature which He has created, perfecting not destroying it.

To investigate the nature of man with hope of finding a purpose to his life, we must follow some logical order. A haphazard search would take much time and give us little assurance of a certain conclusion. In this study of general Ethics, then, let us proceed according to the four causes

or reasons of the moral man and consider the end, the matter, the form, and the efficiency of our subject.

Though men differ greatly in their life's aim, all admit that the reason they act as they do is because within their hearts is a desire for happiness. Each man determines for himself where this happiness lies and then proceeds to make it his own. But time bears witness to the fact that, although all men seek happiness, many there are who search in vain. Now the question arises, since all men naturally seek happiness, can there be an answer to that search in human nature itself?

All of nature has a purpose. Eyes are used only for seeing, ears for hearing. It, of course, appears ridiculous to suppose that ears see or eyes hear. Their function is naturally determined. Then it is equally ridiculous to maintain that the nature of man does not have some determination or a final cause.

Looking at nature we see that the ordinary pattern is one of growth and self-perfection – from the seed to the plant, from the acorn to the oak. We can assume then that nature seems to tend toward its ultimate perfection, its perfect good. The supreme excellence of a power is realized in its operation. For example, the talent of a violinist attains perfection only when he is actually playing.

Just as the perfection of a pitcher consists in his pitching, not his hitting, the perfection of man as he is man should consist in a development of his highest power, the one which distinguishes him from the rest of material creation, reason. Of the rational powers, the intellect is superior to the will; and within the intellect, the speculative operation takes precedence over the practical which only applies speculative truths to the particular circumstances. Thus we may conclude that the highest degree of perfection within man's reach lies in the operation of his highest faculty, the speculative intellect. That act is called contemplation. This is not to claim that there can be no happiness this side of contemplation. We merely state that contemplation is the height of natural perfection and *a fortiori* of natural happiness. There are other degrees below it, always directed by right reason, which result in human happiness though not in its totality.

Man then, by his very nature, has a determined goal and his happiness necessarily depends on the extent to which he attains it. Here that remarkable factor of human nature enters the picture, free will. We proceed to accomplish this task of self-perfection by our human acts. The idea that man can choose any end he wishes is a mere dream. By nature he is directed to a supreme good; nothing but the best can satisfy his innate hunger for perfection. Lesser goods can dissuade him from his destined end but they can never replace it.

If, then, true happiness is to be captured, the whole man must be devoted to the cause. Each and every act must be directed to that end.

Failure to achieve unity of purpose in our lives can only result in frustration.

A difficulty which we face in striving to perfect our nature is the subjugation, not eradication, of our irascible and concupiscible passions and the enthronement of reason in our personality. Only when the rational part of our nature has assumed control are we able to unite our whole being toward its ultimate human perfection. "United we stand, divided we fall," is more than ever true of the human personality.

With reason in control, our intellectual and volitive powers combine to lead man, passions and all, to a keen perfection of nature. Principally there are three steps which a man takes in arriving at right action: counsel, choice, and command. Counsel takes place in the intellect where man sits in judgment. Before him are presented all of the different courses of action to be taken. Just as a man scrutinizes the bids of building contractors to discern which is the best means for accomplishing his purpose, so the human intellect goes over all the possibilities and chooses the one it thinks will most perfectly conform to the end in mind. The determined means is then presented to the will which either approves or disapproves; this is termed choice. If the course is ratified by the will, the verdict is referred again to the intellect which exercises its veto power; the final outcome is here decided. If the intellect issues the command, the powers of the body move into action and another step is taken toward happiness. Throughout the process, intellect and will work in close harmony but the ultimate decision is left to the senior partner, the intellect.

It sometimes happens that a conflict will arise and that our freedom of choice is somewhat constrained. These impediments interject themselves into our council chamber and attempt to coerce our confused minds. Chief among them are external violence, ignorance, fear, and emotion. These four, knowing well that they can never direct man by true and rational argument, attempt to cloud and distort the vision in the wild hope that they may seize control of a will not too firm in its rectitude, turn off the light of the intellect, and issue the command for action in the darkness and blindness of their own company.

That this is not phantasy we all know too well. These impediments to right reason knock constantly at the door, but they themselves realize well what chance they have to coerce a will fixed firmly to a star. If God Himself, the Creator of our will, does not force it, certainly no external or internal forces in this world can compel submission. Only when the light of the intellect has been dimmed or extinguished can they succeed.

The stage is set. The perfection of man is our aim; he is perfected by his own free and deliberate acts, the material cause. It now remains for moral philosophy to point out how the will and its acts may be conformed to the end, and thus we approach the third of our causes, the formal cause, morality.

Brother Dominic:

Thank you for these references. I've taken down the titles, journals and dates, and I plan to read the articles when I get a little more time.

Sister Mary Briant, B.V.M.



The common conception of morality is quite vague. It is so vague, in fact, that the Supreme Court of the United States recently stated that they did not possess a sufficiently clear knowledge of the term to make an official legal judgment concerning it. The science of Ethics investigates the problem of morality's true nature and attempts to cast aside the curtain of personal opinion and local custom which conceal the true concept of a moral norm from the mind of man.

Morality is a rule which tends to stabilize and rectify all of our powers, rational and appetitive, and direct them toward the fullness of human personality. This rule presents our actions in the light of the ultimate goal and judges them to be either in conformity with the end or not. It is not a mere code of convention conceived in a puritanical mind for the purpose of prohibiting pleasure. Morality arises from the very nature of man and his conformity to its rules, the rules of right reason, will lead him to a fullness which rebellion could never offer.

But how is the morality of an act determined? Every act has an objective end which determines and specifies it. For instance, a man gives ten dollars to a crippled children's hospital. This is a good act, for the object is to relieve suffering children. Suppose we add a circumstance, saying that the donor had stolen the ten dollars from a blind man. The morality of the act would evidently be different. Primarily then, the morality of our actions is determined by the object of the act, and secondarily by the accompanying circumstances. Taken in relation to man's final end, actions are judged good or bad by the rule of morals.

The end we have established; the means to that end are free human acts, the measure of which is morality. What remains for us to consider is the extremely practical matter of actual operation, the efficient cause of moral philosophy and moral living, virtue.

In common parlance the word "virtue" bears a not at all appealing connotation. We tend to bestow this term "virtue" on the righteous Puritan who looks down his nose at pleasure in any form. This idea has distorted in modern minds the true meaning of and the real necessity for virtue in the happy life. People do not desire virtue today because they do not understand it. The etymological origin of the word sheds some light upon its correct meaning; it comes from the Latin word *vir* meaning "man," and more proximately from *virtus* meaning "strength." This is its proper meaning here and throughout human life, strength or power. When we have discovered that perfection brings happiness, that our free acts under the rule of morality are the means whereby we attain to this maximum development of personality, our course is charted. Yet in speaking of free will and our voluntary acts we mentioned certain impediments which insert themselves into our council meetings in the hope of overcoming reason and compelling the will to act blindly. Exterior violence, ignorance, fear, and emotion, when left to themselves can buffet and

bully a man and reduce him to slavery. The will needs protection from these cowardly attackers. This champion of right reason is virtue.

By nature we are creatures of habit. To take careful deliberation before each and every action would be humanly impossible. As it is, we form definite dispositions which incline us to perform some actions almost by nature; in fact we call them second nature. This, in the moral order, is virtue. It is a good operative habit, that is, a habit which inclines us to perform right acts easily, with pleasure, and connaturally. Thus virtue fortifies the will, subjects the emotions to a domination of right reason, and makes it possible for man to act in a rational and human way for his greater good.

In struggling to conform our actions to the ideal of life, we have consciously to install these dispositions in our will. Only when the will has acquired stability can we operate easily without battling our lower nature each step of the way and derive pleasure from our action. The only way to acquire these habits is through practice. Slowly at first, with some degree of concentration necessary, we perform the good act. The next time it is less difficult. After much practice we begin to perform the act with ease, and any action contrary to the habit is distasteful. The virtue reaches perfection when the opposed vice cannot lure us from our path.

Man is a complex creature, part animal and part spirit. His members are morally disorganized, each trying to assert itself unrestrained. Such a group of appetites and powers without a firm bond of unity would bring havoc into the life of man. It is for this reason that a man must acquire virtues to unite under the flag of right reason all of his powers, animal and spiritual. Virtues then, are of two kinds, moral virtue which rectifies the animal in us, intellectual virtue which perfects the rational part of our nature. Because the mind has two functions, speculative and practical, two distinct types of intellectual virtue are necessary. The speculative virtue we need in order to grasp the truth requisite for the full attainment of our perfection, the practical virtue must be had to apply this truth to our daily actions.

The moral virtues, commonly called cardinal virtues, are four: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are the pillars upon which our moral life rests and they are intended to perfect the whole man. All of the many other moral virtues can be reduced to one of these. Temperance, for example, is concerned with moderating our desire for the pleasures connected with food, drink, and sex. Not that such pleasure is essentially evil but if allowed an unrestricted freedom, it could be detrimental to the greater good of man. While temperance tends to establish equilibrium within, the virtue of fortitude instills in the soul a certain firmness which enables us to resist dangers, even the danger of death, that moral integrity be preserved. Thus these two virtues guard our personal good. The third virtue, justice, has as its object the giving to others

what is their due. Under it are contained all of our relations with the rest of mankind.

These three are known as moral virtues; each resides in a power which is not of itself rational yet partakes in the governance of reason. The fourth virtue is the cornerstone of moral character, prudence. Formally, that is, according to its essence, it is an intellectual virtue and by its very nature rational. However, its purpose is to judge rationally and in the light of the final end every moral problem that arises. Therefore, we often find prudence listed with the moral virtues because it is their director. The three moral virtues rectify the will and emotions and determine them to the greatest good; prudence presupposes that the right goal has been chosen and selects the most apt means for attaining it in each particular circumstance. Thus the virtues work hand in hand, complementing each other and tending always toward man's happiness.

When harmony is established in the human microcosm and reason is in full control, we have a happy person, but still not the most perfect. Earlier we showed that man's ultimate perfection consists in the development of his highest faculty, which is reason. Moral Science has demonstrated the way that this ultimate perfection and happiness is to be attained. Yet because Ethics is a practical science and our goal is a perfection of the speculative intellect, we must take up our search in that supreme science, the study of wisdom itself, Metaphysics.

Maurice Johnston, O.P.

# POETRY—A KEY TO THE WHOLE MAN

**IN THE COCONUT GROVE CLUB** at Boston a man cried "Fire!" Five hundred people were killed in the mad rush which followed.

Some words cause an immediate crisis. They start a spontaneous chain reaction. "Art" is this kind of a word. All you have to do is to turn the discussion to any art form. Then just say anything. Don't worry about a lull in the party. Somebody will always disagree.

Of all the arts, poetry is supreme. It is the most human of the arts. It is the art closest to man's heart. But it can also be the most exasperating of the arts. For when a new generation or even the same generation is confronted with the word *interpretation,* then the mad rush starts. Poetry can be the most difficult of the arts to understand. At times it seems like the old shell game. Now you see it; now you don't.

It is not without good reason that poetry seems to many like a tree sheathed in ice after a drizzling rain and sudden freeze. Poetry appears like this composition in glaze. It's lovely to look at, but not something you can sink your teeth into, nor care to. The appearances belie its true form.

Exactly what is poetry? Authorities have attempted to pin down this will-o'-the-wisp art in various ways. Some have viewed poetry in terms of grammatical technique. Others have upheld it as the source of erudition and culture. This is the anthology approach, prominent in schools today. Still others cling to poetry because it gives them an emotional thrill. The average person views this type of self-acclaimed esthete with a sceptical eye, and rightly so. Such a person does just as much harm to true poetry as the "poet" who prostitutes his art in one way or another. Some who are more conservative about the effects of poetry vaguely claim a sort of inspiration. Others interpret poetry with a moralistic viewpoint—poetry makes you good.

All these conceptions of poetry are true in some degree. That poetry causes these various effects is readily conceded. But none of these views give much of a fundamental notion as to what poetry itself is. Poets themselves are vague in this regard. However, it hardly seems literary Hoyle to ask a poet to explain himself, as though you had looked over an artist's shoulder and asked him, critically, why he made *that* stroke. If he is a patient man he may remark, "That's for you to decide." And this is his prerogative. Poetry may not be a lucrative profession, but the poetic license it confers does have some advantages. The artist or poet expresses himself as best he can in his own medium. It is up to his audience to interpret what he has done. It is here, of course, that all the controversy arises.

While we may personally respect a poet's rights, it is to be expected that questions concerning poetry will invariably be asked. People have always regarded poetry as somehow sacrosanct, even though what it means may escape them. Men are naturally attracted to the beautiful. Poetry, they reason, contains an intuition into beauty.

To approach poetry through study of the beautiful may seem to be the solution to all our difficulty. But in actual fact, this is the most circuitous route. Beauty is an analogical term, a word with many different meanings, although there is a common basis of similarity. So when all your study of the beautiful would be said and done, still you could not speak with any authority proper to poetry. Your conclusions and notions of beauty would be equally applicable to the electron microscope, angels, or a finesse in bridge.

The most simple and appropriate way of considering poetry is to begin immediately with poetry itself, and to consider its peculiar difficulties as they arise.

At first glance, a strict analysis of poetry through the four causes may seem like putting a sprig of purple haw through a meat grinder to appreciate its beauty. Definitely, there is a danger of losing sight of the poetic whole by focusing attention on one particular cause at a time. But by so doing, we have a method of getting at the heart of poetry by cutting through the Gordian knots of literary vagaries.

The most obvious thing about a poem is its words. Words are the medium of communication. Poetry is social and meant to be heard.

Words and their natural properties are the general matter required for poetry. The sound of a word, alone or combined with other words, that is, its rhythm, accent, quality and pitch, determines to a great extent its natural poetic effect. Some words are by nature poetic and lend themselves to expression; others do not. On this basis the composer Wagner claimed German to be the most imitative of nature. For this same reason, translations of poetry can never hope to duplicate the original

expression. Languages vary, and the natural effects in one do not exist in another. Classical Greek poetry was primarily concerned with the pitch and quality of the vowels. On the other hand, English poetry emphasizes the accent.

But more important in a poem than the words themselves are the ideas which the words signify. Here is the heart of the matter! But this can also be the exasperating part of poetry.

First we must realize that there is a radical difference between scientific language and poetic language. The methodical person restricts every word to one idea. This enables him to express the truth more clearly and directly. With the poet the situation is exactly the opposite. His appeal to truth is an indirect one – to appeal first to the senses, thereby imperceptibly and less painfully affecting the intellect. People feel before they think. Realizing this, the poet, by using various words, arouses sensory images which will in turn produce ideas. What may at first seem to be unintelligible gibberish, on closer observation reveals the extreme care taken in its construction. The poet's hand first touches a man's heart, and then his head.

This is why poetry may seem so aggravating. Admittedly, the poet seldom says precisely what he means. It is necessary in appreciating poetry that a person be able to flex his concepts. Those who demand everything in black and white will be little drawn or affected by anything which hints of purple passages. The tendency common today is to take words only at their face value. With this approach the understanding of poetry naturally suffers. This attitude is like that of the editor who sent a cub reporter to cover the Johnstown flood. Eager to make an impression with his richest prose, the cub sent back a lyrical news story which began, "God stands today on a hill overlooking Johnstown, His heart full of pity . . ." The editor wired back, "Forget flood. Interview God, and get pictures!"

A difficulty arises: if one word can have many meanings it is evident that the subject to whom the poetry is directed may misinterpret the word, or even infer meanings the poet never intended. This is largely a matter of individual poetic skill. By association, one word may conjure up a host of images. For example, the word "rose" suggests a number of meanings – the flower, beauty in general, or Mary, the Mystical Rose. So the poet, by one word, can imply various ideas. In actual instance of this, T. S. Eliot, the noted English poet, once confided at a student poetry seminar of a midwestern university in the United States, "In one of my poems I use the words, 'the spectre of a Rose.' Now, I intended that to refer to the War of Roses. Then I wanted it to hint of Sir Thomas Browne's famous 'ghost of a Rose.' . . . But I was also quite pleased to hear that some people thought it referred to Nijinsky (and the ballet associated with him)." So there is virtually no end of meanings which a word might suggest.

All this play on words might seem hopeless to understand were it not for the fact that all metaphors, similes, and hyperboles use as their springboard the literal meaning of the word. It is, therefore, legitimate for the poet to use a single word to signify various ideas. They are, properly speaking, forms of analogy. This reduces all the meanings to a unity and makes the poem one.

Poetry then, may have various levels of intelligibility. The objective interpretation of a poem depends on the depth given it by the poet. James Joyce acknowledges that he wrote *Ulysses* with five levels of intelligibility in mind. It is a challenge to the reader of a poem to elicit the various meanings in as much as he is able. So a poem may present different thoughts to different people, depending on their own insight and sensitivity. In this sense it is true that each person has his own particular taste. However, certain interpretations or levels of meaning are more noble, and superior to others. But the literal meaning is the foundation of them all.

Word imagery is not to obscure the theme of the poem, but rather to bring out its thought more imaginatively. A reader may elicit images and ideas from a poem which the author never intended. They may enhance the central theme of the poem or obscure it. So the person who interprets a poem may fall short of the poet's meaning or accidentally go beyond it. But the general rule for poetic interpretation is to see if one's interpretation runs consistently through the entire piece. If so, it may be considered as a legitimate interpretation.

Poetry then, is concerned with ordering ideas. For this reason it is a part of Logic, unpoetic as it may sound. Poetics pertains to Logic in its broad sense, namely to Dialectics. The poet aims to arouse images and with them to order ideas for his desired effect. Words then, are the secondary material of poetry, while the ideas which they signify are the primary matter.

America is again moving to the country, and the dream of every young couple is to build their own home. When they call in an architect to design it, his first questions are, in words somewhat less pointed, "How much have you got, and what do you want?" And this is true of all the practical arts; that is, their purpose or final cause determines the form which will be required. In an analysis of poetry, we can use the same procedure. Having already considered the material cause of poetry, by now considering its purpose we will be able to determine exactly the form it must take.

In judging an art work the first rule is that the artist must present some aspect of truth. The poet as well as the artist is held to this law, for it pertains to the poet as a man. The qualities of a man are presupposed to his art. If he does not present the truth, he is distorting reality; and the form of his art, regardless of how good it may be in itself, is vicious since it is ordered to a false end.

The poet is far from being entirely free and independent, and is held to portray more than merely degraded reality. This would be but half the truth, and the trouble with half-truths is that people usually cling to the wrong half. It is a sad commentary on contemporary literature that, as William Faulkner once remarked, modern writers do not write of the heart but of the glands.

To present truth so that it may be grasped is no easy task, but fortunately, man can approach it in many different ways. The sciences use a direct method while poetry is more subtle and indirect. Truth in the form of a poetic dose is more easily taken for it is persuasive rather than dogmatic. Few can stomach the cut and dried method of a purely intellectual approach. Keenly aware of this, the poet knows how to say the right thing at just the right time.

Man is a unique creature. He has an intellect for contemplating the truth and senses through which his ideas are formed. But while his highest activity is that of the intellect, this faculty is dependent on his senses. So an acute difficulty arises when the senses are not in harmony. Then the intellect is blind and disabled. The special aptitude of the poet is not so much to know the truth as to know how to present it in a manner engaging to the senses.

In this respect poetry is similar to the various forms of rhetoric, advertising, sermons, political speeches. Poetics and Rhetoric are distinct arts, but are indirect ways to the truth. Both dispose a person to accept the truth, though each art works in different ways. Rhetoric has as its end a moral exhortation, a resolution to act. Truth, however, is grasped by resting in contemplation.

Poetry is a more indirect approach to truth than rhetoric, but in the above sense it is closer since it leads to immediate rest, a repose of the passions. This is the condition immediate to contemplating truth. Poetry moves the passions and resolves them. It relaxes the emotions when they are knotted for poetry is therapeutic.

Though this effect of poetry may not be obvious at first glance, we are well aware of it in music. Who has not experienced the soothing effects of a Mozart symphony? It was this feature of music which led Pythagoras to inquire scientifically why music had such a tempering effect on the passions. At the present time there is a renewed interest in this therapeutic effect and its application to mental disorders.

By means of poetic images curiosity is aroused in the passions. Then it fades and the intellect takes over. When the passions are quiet, the intellect is free to see the truth. This is the poet's final aim, to dispose the passions of an individual so that he may properly consider the truth. Aristotle calls such a resolution the *catharsis.* If there is no such resolution in a poem, it has failed. Poetic justice demands a plausible ending. This

is why we feel dissatisfied with a play or movie which never quite untangles itself. It is akin to the feeling we have after reading "The Lady or the Tiger." Poetry's catharsis is the antidote to this. Milton's *Samson Agonistes* is an obvious example of producting this final tranquillity. A good reading of poetry should leave a person relaxed and meditative. This resolution or catharsis is the answer.

Every poet has some literary bone to pick, an argument to present. Seldom do you find a poet who has nothing of consequence behind his poetic imagery. At times Swinburne is an exception to this rule as Schumann is in music. But the poet generally has something to convey, using the best means at his disposal to put the point across. Since poetry is an art closest to the human heart, the poet must present his argument in a form as natural but as inconspicuous as the initial signs of affection between lovers.

Every art or science has a definite form of argument which best exposes its case. In general there are two forms, a type of syllogism, or induction, the enumeration of particular instances. The demonstrative science uses a strict form of syllogism. To most people this strictly logical demonstration seems confining, and it is. The syllogism is not a good form for poetry where expression must be plastic, not static.

To get his point across succinctly the rhetorician commonly utilizes an abbreviated form of the syllogism, the enthymeme. He states only one premise from which he draws the conclusion. A shorter form of induction, the example, is the usual form in modern advertising. "Ben Hogan smokes Chesterfields." You draw your own conclusion. The example is an imperfect induction, a single instance is presented and the conclusion need not follow necessarily. But it *is* concrete. This makes it decidedly easy for the person to visualize and then identify himself with such an example. Since poetry aims at a catharsis through such an identification, we begin to see that some such example will be the ideal form for the expression of poetry.

An example can be historical or fictional. The former is a weak poetical form since it is difficult to find actual happenings which not only arouse the emotions but also give the perfect resolution required by poetry. The fictional example is a combining by the imagination of various things not found together in reality. With this form the poet is free to manipulate images, thereby producing the exact resolution he desires. The fictional example then, is the ideal poetic form.

The poet can create a fictional example of innumerable things; but when he does so with human action, he uses this poetic form at its best. It must be an action because only an action can have a resolution. And this is most moving when it is a portrayal of something human, since human actions are most familiar to us. Such actions create an empathy in the human heart, man's most vulnerable spot. This art form of the

poet, that of using a fictional human action as an example, Aristotle calls *imitation.* People are naturally receptive and inclined to imitation. Children mimic; adults daydream of the past and future.

Imitations of human actions in poetry are presented as single instances. But by portraying the basic problems of all men, they mirror a universal theme. This is why the acknowledged classics are perennially rediscovered. There is always a new generation engrossed by the same problems. So Shakespeare's *Hamlet* is not merely a foreign prince, but the type for all men who are tragic because they too cannot make up their mind. For this reason, poetry is more universal than history, which deals solely with the particular events of the past.

Human imitation is the form which poetry best uses to arouse and resolve the emotions. It is this which makes poetry live. It is the form which compels the audience to laugh when the poet laughes and weep when the poet weeps.

England has had her poet laureate since the thirteenth century. She as well as other countries have recognized the poet as different from other men. He has been the object of their admiration and awe. People may not be able to understand the poet, but they instinctively respect him.

The poet is revered because his work is uniquely a one man job. He alone is the cause of his art. Men may join complementary forces and become another "four-horsemen" combination, but the poet stars alone. No one can duplicate his expression. Though poets are seldom well paid (is it ironic or fitting that men should not pay those who touch their hearts?), there is never a lack of aspiring poets. For their benefit and ours, we ask, "What makes a poet, and what makes the poet's poet?"

The first requirement would be some knowledge of grammar, the aim of poetry and of the means it employs to achieve this aim. When writing, the poet is seldom explicitly aware of these matters. He does them by second nature, through experience. Constant reflection would cramp his style.

Secondly, the poet must be sensitive to life and to nature. Some people are sensitive only in a passive way. They lack the spark of spontaneity and originality. But give them the initial spark and they are on fire. Literary critics are frequently of this bent. Often mediocre in original writing, once given the material to work on, they can deeply appreciate and criticize it. But the poet must be more than merely passive in his appreciation. He must be creative. He must have an active sensibility. He must be able to see and communicate what others cannot see, or at least may not be able to express. The poet must have ready emotions, keen senses, intuition, and a vivid imagination to combin the images he requires for the poetic form. In a sense poets are born, not made. Many of the greatest poets have led vicious personal lives. But it can be

easily seen why; their impressionable nature can play havoc with them if it isn't controlled. All genius exacts a price.

A person with a knowledge of the theory of poetry and an active sensitivity then can produce good poetry. But to produce a masterpiece, something further is required – inspiration, a penetrating light and a tremendous love of the ideal. This is the light which makes the poet see when other men are blind. The Christian poet prays to the Holy Ghost for inspiration; the Greeks invoked the Muses. It is with good reason that the poet prays for the assistance of inspiration, this sudden grasp of the sublime. The poet needs such help because the circumstances leading up to inspiration are largely out of the poet's control. Would we have the *Divine Comedy* if Dante had not, by chance, met Beatrice?

Often something in the concrete can serve as the model for this ideal. Women, not infrequently, have played this role. As Dante had his Beatrice, so Browning had his Elizabeth, and Shubert his Theresa.

The executive causes of a poem are, then, the poet's knowledge of the mechanics of poetry, an active sensitivity, and – if he would be the poet's poet – inspiration.

These are the factors which enable the poet to fuse together and capture in a moment the truths of eternity. All men do not have great minds, but all have hearts. Only a poet can touch them. We who are not gifted to write poetry need only to listen. For whose mind does not soar with the "dapple-dawn-drawn Falcon, . . . rung upon the rein of a wimpling wing in his ecstasy."? Whose weariness does not pass at the sight of green pastures where "The Lord is my shepherd, and I shall not want."? Who is not affected? Only the man who has no music in his ear, and no love in his heart. He is less the man, for his heart is cold. But to be a whole man, I would a poet be.

Louis Bertrand Kroeger, O.P.

# SOMEWHERE EAST OF SUEZ

Ship me somewheres east of Suez, where the best is like the worst
Where there aren't no Ten Commandments an' a man can raise a thirst
*Mandalay,* by Rudyard Kipling

**TO THE EAST OF SUEZ,** sweltering under the equatorial sun, severed from the rest of Asia by the craggy peaks of the Himalayas, lies the vast sub-continent of India: India, lying hard by the cradle of human life; Mother India, land of mystery and mysticism, where even today there are no Ten Commandments, where the best is often very like the worst, and whose soul is athirst for the vision of God. Today for the most part she sits in darkness and in the valley of the shadow of death. But in ages gone by she has cried out from the depths of her soul for light, in works like this Vedic hymn, which is among the oldest of her writings.

> In the beginning there arose the golden child. He was the one born lord of all that is. He established the earth and this sky. Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?
>
> He who gives life, he who gives strength; whose command all the bright gods revere; whose shadow is immortality, whose shadow is death. Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?
>
> He who, through his power, is the one king of the breathing and awakening world. He who governs all, man and beast. Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?
>
> He through whom the sky is bright and the earth firm; he through whom the heaven was established, nay, the highest heaven; he who measured out the light and the air. Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?
>
> He who by his might looked even over the water-clouds; he who alone is God above all gods. Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?[1]

This hymn from the Rig Veda represents the highest peak of Indian religious and philosophic thought. It was a cry drawn from the heart of India like the plaintive wail of a child before the approach of darkness; and the darkness did come, descending like night-shadows to shroud later Indian thought in obscurity and falsehood.

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[1] Cf. Sir William W. Hunter, "India," in *The History of Nations* (New York; P. F. Collier and Son, 1907-1928), vol. IV, p. 40.

After that comparatively short, early age of illumination the Indian mind became more and more the prey of ignorance and error, until today modern India lives a contradiction, a land where millions of human beings struggle to survive in the midst of withering famine and magnificent opulence, where primitive aboriginal ways of life thrive side by side with one of the world's most ancient cultures. There the One God is worshiped, but not alone. Monotheism is still to be found among the aborigines, but so is Animism. The low castes are riddled with polytheism, idol worship, and atheism; and today's Brahman, the religious and cultural heir of the ancient Vedic poet whose song has been quoted, finds himself a pantheist, at best believing in a kind of monism. The pendulum has swung to the ultimate absurdity, so that Indian thinkers presently contend that the end of all being rests in Non-being.

India is a great three-cornered country hanging from mid-Asia like a huge inverted pear stretching southward into the sea. Northward the base of the pear is joined fast to the continent by the Himalaya ranges; the greater part of its western coast is washed by the Arabian sea, and against the chief part of its eastern side crash the waves of the Bay of Bengal. While thus guarded by natural defenses, the mountains and the sea, there are on its northeastern and northwestern frontiers, two opposite sets of doorways to the rest of Asia. The wild hill regions between Burma and the Communist-held table-land of Tibet bound it on the northeast, and on the northwest lie the Mohammedan states of Afghanistan and Baluchistan.

The great triangle of India jutting out into the sea midway between East and West has been for centuries the battleground of the most widely differing cultures. In India today there is found every problem which confronts the missionary in any other part of the globe, so that it can be said that he who can make converts in India can make them anywhere in the world.

Modern India, exercising today a role of the utmost importance in the struggle between the slave world and the free, has been many times in the past the scene of great conflicts. Along its broad base lies the vast mass of the Himalayas, serving as a great natural barrier protecting India on the north from the threat of an invading army. There are only a few passes through these, the highest mountains in the world, and through them lies the path of any invading army. At the southern base of the Himalayas steams the great rain-forest, the home of brilliantly plumed parrots, chattering monkeys, and a few tribes of aborigines. Due to the fever which stalks in the jungle waiting to claim tribute from those humans hardy enough to risk the jungle's terrors, there are few inroads of civilization to disturb the forest peace.

It is instead to the south of the jungle, in the great and fertile river plains, that India's major cities are located. It is there beside the sacred rivers, and along the seacoast, and on the arable Deccan plateau that the

cities have sprung up, vast, teeming centers of life reaching lacy minarets to the hard, blue sky. Cities already old before European men first thought of setting stone on stone; cities like Calcutta, Delhi, Malacca, and the Goa of Francis Xavier have for centuries borne their cargo of human souls on the journey to eternity.

As the two legs of the triangle which is India draw together, the land again becomes mountainous. But once beyond this barrier of rock and thick forest the earth levels out in a vast plateau, sloping gently east and westward to the sea in long mountains which are called Ghats, a Sanskrit word meaning steps. It is here in the central plateau region, the Deccan, that the early Dravidian inhabitants sought safety from the invading hordes of Aryan conquerors. There Aryans, fierce warriors, entered India from the northwest, probably through the famed Khyber pass, from the Mesopotamian river valley, which lies west and north of India's Punjab. It was the Aryans, bringing with them the notion of the sky-god, who began the history of Indian civilization. From the extant records they seem to have had a high concept of God and of morality. They were a people of higher culture than the original Dravidian settlers, fiercely proud of their more vigorous physical constitution, their superior prowess in war and of their "bright gods."

But from the beginning, due to the extremely rugged geographical condition of the Indian terrain, interpenetration among the conquered and conquerors was difficult. Added to the geographical situation, the excessive racial pride of the Aryans made intermarriage with the Dravidians and aborigines unthinkable, and so the captured people were employed as serfs and slaves, while their Aryan captors reserved to themselves the duties of priest and ruler, soldier and tradesman.

In recent years a credible theory has been built up which would assign the monotheistic elements present in early Hinduism to the indigenous Dravidians and to the truly primitive Indian tribes antedating them. According to this theory it was the more primitive cultures which preserved monotheism almost intact, the knowledge of the Oneness of God only later deteriorating in higher cultures. This seems to accord reasonably with the facts, for the Aryan invaders were polytheists at best, and yet the religion which they developed had strong monotheistic tendencies. Moreover, since that golden age at its beginning, Hinduism has steadily degenerated into a pantheistic monism. But at any rate it seems certain that whatever the primitive beliefs of the Aryans and their Dravidian captives, Hinduism represents a synthesis of them.[2] These factors, then, the geographical and social isolation of the early Dravidian settlers, and the racial aloofness of the Aryan invaders are the major causes of the peculiar constitution of the Hindu religion. And the Hindu religion is India.

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[2] Wilhelm Koppers, "The Concept of God in the Religions of India," in *Primitive Man and His World Picture* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1952).

Father Joseph Tennant has defined Hinduism as, "that traditional way of life for every stratum of Indian society in all its ramifications – religious, social, economic and personal – which in practice is tacitly accepted by the Brahman class and is practiced by the people because of the Brahman approval."[3] Hinduism, then, represents an outlook on life, and a primarily negative one at that, handed down from the earliest period of Indian history. In actual fact it probably represents a compromise between the religion of the Aryans, the monotheism of the subjugated Dravidians, and the cruder animism of the primitive aborigines.

Down through the ages Hinduism has prospered, notwithstanding the most violent upheavals, political and religious. The two mainstays which account for its endurance are probably the caste system and the doctrine of *Karma.* The Indian word for caste is *Varna,* which means color, or, perhaps, blood. It appears that the caste system was invented to keep the conquered nations in subjugation. The story is that in the beginning of the world the Brahman proceeded from the mouth of the Creator; the Kshatriya or Rajput, the warrior class, from his arms; and Vaisya from his belly or thighs; the Sudra from his feet.

At one time there were only four castes, the Brahmans, or priestly caste, the Kshatriyas, or warriors, the Vaisyas, who are for the most part middle class tradesmen, and finally the Sudras, who are dedicated to manual labor. Today these are still the main divisions, but within them exist some three or four thousand subcastes. Certain tasks and occupations are considered unclean and left by the members of the higher classes to the low castes for performance. Thus, for instance, cobblers contitute one group because their trade involves touching the skins of animals. Once a man is born into a caste he almost never rises above it.

This arrangement of society, unique to India, is, of course, not unagreeable to members of the privileged classes, but it seems incredible at first glance that the millions of Sudras – by far the largest single group – should uncomplainingly and even willingly accept a life of unending hardship, bleak poverty, and unfailing misery. Moreover, although the religious conceptions of the Brahman class are incomparably more noble than the superstitious animism of the Sudras and outcastes or "untouchables," they make not the slightest missionary endeavor or attempt at education. For example, Brahman sages for centuries perceived the truth that God is One, and yet they contemplate without alarm the worship on the part of their less enlightened countrymen of natural forces, idols, and even demons.

The reason for this militant apathy and dogmatic indifference is perhaps to be found in the beliefs of the Hindus themselves. It is the pantheistic monism subscribed to by the Brahmans which makes this

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[3] Joseph J. Tennant and Stephen W. Johnson, "Hinduism," in *Mission Academia Study* (New York: America Press, March, 1948), vol. V, no. 7, p. 6.

sort of thing possible from their viewpoint. On the part of the great majority of Hindus, belief in the doctrine of *Karma* suggests a reason for their almost incredible passivity. *Karma* is a Sanskrit word meaning merit. It is the teaching of the Brahman priests that a man undergoes successive rebirths — transmigration, or *samsara* — and that according to the *karma* of his former life he will be reincarnated either in a higher caste or in a lower, or even as some form of animal or insect life, there to continue his process of purification. Purification consists in fulfilling minutely the duties of the caste, and particularly in a scrupulous observance of the ritual ceremonies which attend every activity of daily life.

It is this same doctrine of *Karma* and *Samsara* which accounts for the Hindu's acceptance of the most diverse forms of worship and religious beliefs. His neighbor's holding of errors which are abominable to him fills him with no horror, for he himself believes that a man is not entitled to knowledge above his station. Nor does he aspire to greater knowledge himself. If a man prove deserving in his present incarnation, he will be reincarnated in a higher state and there receive the suitable illumination. The soul, the Hindu believes, has an eternal cycle of transmigrations to undergo, and eventually it will surely be absorbed into the Brahma, the mystic "It" of Hinduism, there to rest awhile before beginning the whole process over again and again and again.

The Brahmans, therefore, precisely because of their esoteric knowldege, represent the highest expression of human perfection. They stand but a single step from absorption into the Absolute. The Brahman, accordingly, by his position in life, by an accident of birth, is the arbiter in ritual questions, which means in every act, even the simplest, of day to day life, and stands as the ultimate authority in determining whether or not a caste is clean or unclean, a man touchable, or untouchable.

At the opposite end of the scale, or rather completely removed from it, stands the outcaste, a man with no religious rights and almost no natural ones. He is the offscouring of Indian society, defiling, worthless, and better not talked about.

In recent years "untouchability" has been done away with by legal enactments, but it may be questioned whether an institution primarily religious and ritualistic several thousand years old can be legislated out of existence by the well-meaning "fiat" of progressive politicians. But previously, in all events, the Brahman's refusal to accept a cup of water from a man signified that he was "untouchable," a decree that meant hunger, loneliness, and in many instances, death.

But the Brahmans are not religious leaders in the usual sense of the word, despite their eminence in Indian society. What they believe has little influence upon the beliefs of those beneath them in the caste system, as it is to be expected that the priestly class should possess truer knowledge of the Absolute than, say, a Sudra. Nor can the poor, living in

squalor and misery, reproach the Brahman for his luxurious life, because the Brahman does not live one. The highest truth the Brahman knows is the illuminating doctrine that all reality is *Maya* — illusion; that happiness consists in detachment from every good, and the ultimate goal of all his striving is a silent sinking into utter oblivion. How different is this annihilaton from Christian mysticism, which issues in boundless life!

It is this temperament which has enabled Hinduism to withstand, or better, to absorb influences which would have rent asunder any sharply defined system of religion. The invasion of the Greeks under Alexander the Great, the defections of Buddhism and Jainism, the Moslem conquest, the modern incursion of the British Empire, even the advent of Christianity, although all have left their mark upon Hinduism, all have failed to destroy it.

Whereas Hinduism has been indifferent to other forms of religious belief, it has reacted violently to Christianity, chiefly because the Christian teaching of charity is diametrically opposed to the evils of the caste system. Christianity has reacted in its turn with a program of education and heroic patience. For the most part, instructed converts have been content to ignore caste distinctions, although the Church has issued no positive instructions on the caste question. On the other hand, the first Portuguese missionaries found a complete Christian caste system paralleling that of the Hindus, when they first arrived in Mylapore, a city which had preserved the Faith since Apostolic times.

For years Christian schools supplied the training of many of those young Indians who are now India's leaders, and thanks in part to the early education, in part to their intense nationalism, these men are introducing many long-needed social reforms. But education must still continue, for many Indians of all classes are falling victims to Communist influence; the upper classes perhaps because Communism seems to be a reasonable explanation of their own age-old beliefs, the lower classes for economic reasons. To combat this influence, many Catholic leaders propose an active philsophical apostolate in Indian universities.

But from another aspect the Indian temperament may yet prove of some benefit to the Catholic cause in India. The Indians to a man respect holiness, and the ascetic lives of the Brahmans have given them great sway over the hearts of their countrymen. In recent years the Church has founded monasteries of Benedictine contemplatives, ascetic champions who will meet the Brahman on his own ground in the battle for the soul of India. These saffron-robed monks have entered upon the high pursuit of holiness in the way that it is understood by the Indian mentality. For the most part they are native Indians willing to go to heroic lengths for the salvations of their Indian brothers. Like St. Paul, they are attempting to become all things to all men. In them lies one of the Church's brightest hopes for the future of India. And so, thus

slowly, before the advance of Christianity and Western Civilization, the old order is changing.

It was, and in many places still is, the old order that Christianity has had to face. And although there are in India Catholic Christians who trace their faith back through the centuries to St. Thomas the Apostle, actually the Christian missions have not long been active in India. The first medieval missionaries to visit India were the Franciscan Father, John of Montecorvino and his companion, the Dominican, Father Nicholas of Pistoia. Father Nicholas arrived at Meliapur on the eastern shore of India in the year 1291, and just in time, for his was a short and easy, albeit an important apostolate. All that was asked of him was his life. He died in Meliapur, far from his brothers, that year of 1291, and was buried there in the Church of St. Thomas. Father John of Montecorvino, the Franciscan, carried on alone for a year, baptizing about a hundred persons, and then went on to China. During the next three hundred years many more friars of both Orders evangelized India in the same way as did the Dominican, Nicholas of Pistoia, quietly and quite unglamorously dying, utter "failures," alone and unknown, on the road to China.

There is record of a Dominican friar, Jordan Catalani, arriving in India in 1320 or 1321. He was made bishop of the diocese of Quilon in southern India, and mentions casually the conversion of some ten thousand souls, bought by the blood of five of his martyred Dominican companions. But there was no second bishop of Quilon, and although Franciscan and Dominican missionaries had been laboring sporadically in India from 1291, it was not until 1498, with Vasco de Gama's discovery of a route around the Cape of Good Hope, that the Friars Minor and the Preachers began laboring in earnest.

These early missionaries worked under the patronage of Portugal, an arrangement which limited their influence to the territory controlled by the Portuguese. Eventually, due to the decline of Christianity in Europe and the consequent scarcity of missionaries, little more could be done than to care for the Christian colonists. This static condition prevailed until the last quarter of the nineteenth century when a new start was made in the mission to the pagan peoples of India under the authority of the Propaganda of the Faith. Since that time the Church's growth has not been rapid, but it has been true growth.

The conquest of India for the Faith belongs to no single group. Like every great undertaking it can be accomplished only through cooperation. The position of the East in the Divine Economy seems to have been as "the place to go" in the exercise of Charity. And Catholics went.

Gradually, under the auspices of Propaganda, the numbers of missionaries increased. Capuchins, Carmelites, Salesians, representatives of almost every religious Order and Congregation, men and women of every

land and language, rallied to the Holy Father's call to swell the thin ranks of those who had held the footholds of the Faith against numbing indifference, malignant antipathy, and savage persecutions. For years they had preached to deaf ears. The one convincing argument was their own blood spilled out on the soil of Holy India. The Jesuits came back to India from what seemed their certain extinction to resume their accustomed rank in the vanguard of the Church's warriors.

Today young Americans, born citizens of a nation which did not exist when Indian civilization was already ancient, labor as members of the Society of Jesus and the Congregation of the Holy Cross for the soul of India. Thanks to those missionaries, the Church in modern India is well organized and a powerful force for good, both on the sands of time and in the timeless sands of Eternity.

But now India faces a new crisis in her history. It is like none that has ever befallen her before. For at last the cry, "India for the Indian," has awakened an India which finds herself ruled by Indians. It is in this that the new crisis differs from every other. India has slept through invasions; she has turned a sleepy eye upon other doctrines; she has yawned at the grandeurs of Alexander the Great, the Mogul Empire and the British Crown; simply because they were foreign. Now the slumbering giant has stirred in her sleep, roused by the raucous honking of a century on wheels. Now she is awakened to her great strength. East is East and West is West, and the two are meeting in India.

This is the crossroads. Communism stands threatening at her doorways, and the pantheistic monism of the Brahmans is strangely reminiscent of the Red dogma of Dialectical Materialism. In the coming struggle to remain in power, the ruling Indians may well turn to the policies of the Kremlin to hasten the advent of their own particular brand of "Nirvana." Materialism disports itself in the heart of this mysterious land. And the old gods still beckon; but now a new champion has entered the lists to contest the field with them.

For the Church has come to India. The Church faces the crisis with her. With St. Paul she hymns: "Awake, sleeper, and arise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten thee." With the recent change in government which came about in 1949 at the time of India's freedom, the Catholic Church has been recognized as an "Indian" religion. No longer to be stigmatized as "foreign," her almost completely native hierarchy, together with her ancient apostolic roots in the earth of India have caused her to be accepted, perhaps grudgingly, as a permanent institution by the other Indians.

And with this change in her status the Church enters upon a new and exciting phase in her growth. She is operating under battle conditions; and she is ready for battle. Today she is well organized; the system

of dioceses is completely worked out, and native clergy are more and more manning them.

The Church has come to India. She has brought hospitals, seminaries, and schools, technical instruction and spiritual hope. She has brought priests, brothers and nuns, doctors and teachers; above all, she has brought Christ. But India still needs many things. She needs economic help. She needs agricultural skills. She needs medincine, and education, and sound guidance. But above all her cry is for Christ, for holiness, for light and life. A start has been made, but only a start. For every priest there are a thousand Catholics. For every Catholic there are a hundred pagans. For every hundred thousand pagans there is only one priest. Monasteries of contemplative Benedictines have been established. There are only a few, but the leaven has been planted. Now it must work in silence and suffering, "doomed eternally to death, but fated never to die."

Many questions yet remain to be answered. How will the Church fare in independent India? The Indian nationalist leaders have not yet made up their minds about the Church. They are ready to love her or to hate her, but the fact that the Jesuit, Father Jerome D'Souza, is a member of the Indian delegation to the United Nations gives a happy augury for the Church's acceptance by the new regime. In Theology, can the noble expressions of Hindu religious thought be reconciled with Catholic Theology and Philosophy? Many say they can, and more, that they must be. Others say that a reconciliation is impossible. And what will be the Catholic answer to the delicate question of adaptation to Indian ways of life which are developing as this awakening giant stretches herself and shrugs off the social shackles of centuries? These and many more are questions which must be answered by the men who live their daily lives under the harsh white light of the Indian sun. Only time's unfolding will reveal the answers.

Perhaps soon the ringing question of the Vedic poet: "Who is the God to Whom we shall offer our sacrifice?" will be answered in the words of St. Paul. *What therefore you worship without knowing it, that I preach to you. Jesus Christ and Him crucified. Christ in you, your hope of glory! Him we preach . . . .*

Humbert Crilly, O.P.

# WORK – A DUTY AND A RIGHT

"WITH LABOR AND TOIL shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life," and "in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return to the earth out of which thou wast taken."[1] With these strong words Almighty God first made known to man the path which his progress to destiny must follow. Whether the final term of his life was to be good or evil would be determined to a great extent by the manner in which man carried out this divine decree to work. Thus, from human history's earliest age, work has assumed an importance in each man's life rivalled by few other basically human actions. And yet, because of the superficially unpleasant features of work, the conclusions of serious investigations into its true nature have been surprisingly limited and most frequently erroneous throughout the development of human thought. Today, alarmed anew by the increasingly dangerous false philosophies of work propagated by the materialistic centered "isms" of our time, Christian philosophers, under the Church's leadership, are once again investigating this problem in an effort to arrive at a truly Christian understanding of the function of work in the perfection of man.

In the light of this brief introduction, the limited purpose of this article will be to analyze man's *duty* to work and to examine the consequent *right* to work that must be accorded him in every society. Before entering into a detailed treatment of these two topics, however, it will be advisable to define briefly the three terms "work," "duty," and "right" about which the remainder of the article will be concerned, and then to indicate summarily the history of the idea of work through the ages.

The terms "work" and "labor," which are commonly accepted as synonyms, have no well-established philosophical definitions. An analysis of the nature of work in itself, however, does provide a sufficient basis for developing a satisfactory definition through its four causes.

[1] Gen. 3:17, 19.

The intrinsic causes of any work, namely, the material and formal elements, can be determined with little difficulty for they are always quite apparent to the worker himself. The matter of work includes all of material creation as it is more or less disposed to be changed by man's ingenuity.[2] In our present form of economic organization this "matter" might be loosely associated with the term "capital" because each signifies the physical wealth available for the benefit of society. The formal cause of work, in turn, is nothing but the new form introduced into the material object by the worker. This may take the form of either an accidental or substantial change in the matter, but, in any case, it is always the result of a predetermined plan in the mind of the worker which has the nature of an exemplar cause. St. Thomas comments that because of this intimate relationship between the intellectual operation of man and his action as a worker, it follows that everything he makes or produces bears in some way an image of his intellect.[3] It is this imaging of the creative activity of God that gives man's labor its ultimate dignity. By cooperating through the use of his reason and other faculties man, with God's help, in a sense continues the work of perfecting the material universe around him.

Work, in so far as it is a transitive action, can only be performed formally by man acting as its efficient cause, for it belongs solely to a rational nature both to recognize the end and to ordain the means to attain the end.[4] Moreover, in a correct definition of the action of work, the note of transitiveness must always be included for the very end of all work is the perfection of something outside of the worker himself.[5] This does not preclude, however, a direct relationship between the perfection of the work and the perfection of the worker, since all work would be impossible without the previous immanent acts of knowing and willing on the part of the agent.[6] This correlation between the work and the worker will be developed more fully below when considering man's duty to work.

There is one additional characteristic of this human action called work that should be mentioned and that is its association with the difficult. As the object of all work is the induction of a new form into some already existing matter, there always exists a twofold opposition that must be overcome – the limited power of the worker and the natural indisposition of the matter to receive a new form. Thus there are some things that man will never be able to do by his own efforts and there are certain other works of man that can be accomplished only after a great deal of labor, whether it be intellectual or manual or both.

Finally, the ultimate end of work or its final cause is the perfection of the exterior matter which results only when the exemplar plan is re-

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[2] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 96, a. 2.
[3] St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, II, c. 45.
[4] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 18, a. 3.
[5] *Contra Gen.*, II, c. 1.
[6] *Ibid.*

produced in the effect. Now as all work is the result of a *human* act, it necessarily follows that the final end should be the production of a *human* or *useful* good which will be of some benefit to man or society. As social animals men need the help of their fellow-men to sustain life itself. This assistance is accomplished through the mutuality of their labor.[7]

In summarizing the above brief consideration of the causes of work, we can now define work as a transitive human action modifying matter into a useful good for society. Note that this definition includes both intellectual and manual labor. For St. Thomas every human activity, even an intellectual activity which employs some material instrument, can be considered manual labor if it is pursued in order to obtain the material necessities of life.[8] Thus intellectual activities are divided into those ordained to contemplation and those directed toward the production of exterior effects. It must be emphasized, however, that intellectual "labor" directed solely to contemplation is essentially an immanent activity, and, in the light of the above definition, can be considered as "work" only equivocally. Such "work" is not within the scope of this paper.

The term "duty" can be defined simply as an obligation to another implying a relation to act.[9] When it is used in a particular sense as it is in this article, it thus indicates an obligation to others to perform a determined action, that is, to work.

The English word "right" has many meanings and therefore it is necessary to note that here all references to the term will be only to its juridic acceptations as defined below. According to St. Thomas, "right" as it is the proper object of justice denotes that which is due to another according to an equality.[10] This, the formal meaning of the term, is usually designated as objective right. But there is yet another type of right which we must also consider. This is subjective right, or in terms of its definition, the legitimate power or faculty of claiming that which is due as one's own.[11] The former is totally dependent on the latter and is measured by it. It is the application of these two terms to the general topic of man's work which concerns us here.

In order to arrive at a better understanding of the problem of work, it will be helpful to consider briefly the history of the idea of work as it developed in the civilizations which have contributed so much to our own cultural and intellectual formation. The following account, therefore, will trace cursorily the recognition accorded work in the cultures

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[7] *Contra Gen.*, III, c. 134.
[8] St. Thomas, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, VII, a. 17.
[9] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 1, ad. 3.
[10] *Ibid.*, q. 57, a. 1.
[11] Thomas M. Zigliara, O.P., *Summa Philosophica* (11th ed., Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1898), Vol. III, p. 125.

of ancient Greece, Rome, and Israel, as well as in the early Christian, medieval, and modern periods.

Among the ancient Greeks the esteem in which work was held declined steadily from the earliest historical periods until the advent of Christianity. In the great epics of Homer (c. 900 B.C.) heroes, gods, and goddesses alike are all depicted as skilled and constant workers. Soon thereafter, however, Hesiod in his *Works and Days* labors ceaselessly to instill in his fellowmen a sense of the necessity of work despite its heavy yoke. From then on, except for a few very limited periods when economic policy demanded a more favorable view, the idea of work became ever more repugnant to all classes. A typical expression of the philosophers perennial contempt for work is found in Aristotle's statement that "the citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties.[12] Finally, the institution of slavery added yet another cause for discrediting work. As the power of the city states increased, so too did the percentage of slave laborers, and this quite naturally further reduced the status of the freeman worker until eventually it resulted in his being publicly derided.[13]

In Imperial Rome the idea of work, whether agricultural, mechanical, or domestic, met with an even more severe condemnation than in the Hellenic East, for in the West the institution of slavery was far more extensive and completely dominated the economic organization of society. In the early years of the Christian era, however, a gradual removal of the opprobrious label attached to work was effected due to the increased interest in the dignity of man, whether slave or free, that resulted from the ascendant Stoic philosophy of the age. This system of thought, in stressing the ideas of natural duty and the common good, provided the growing class of free workers with a positive motive for working and did much to prepare the way for the more healthy Christian view of work which was soon to sweep through the Empire.

In contrast to the views generally prevailing in the pagan Roman and Greek worlds, the Jews, throughout their history, held the duty of work in high esteem. References to many kinds of work and, in fact, commands to work abound in the Old Testament, and the Jews firmly believed that only by obeying this Law of the Almighty could they ever expect to attain their reward. This healthy attitude toward work received an additional stimulus with the coming of Christ, Who was both God and worker, and it is this, the Christian concept of work, that will be considered in more detail below.

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[12] Aristotle, *Politica* (ed. Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle;* New York: Random House, 1941), VII, ch. 9, 1328b 39-1329a.

[13] Chief source for this and the following two paragraphs was: Arthur T. Geoghegan, *The Attitude Towards Labor in Early Christianity and Ancient Culture* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic Press, 1945).

In the early centuries of Christianity this new attitude toward man's labor, dominated as it was by a spirit of charity and universal brotherhood, gradually supplanted the shallow and degrading pagan concepts of work. As medieval Europe developed, however, this noble idea of work in turn gave way to a more negative and severe viewpoint. In the Christian Middle Ages the necessity of work was clearly recognized but it was more commonly looked upon chiefly as a universal form of doing penance and practicing asceticism.[14] The well known dictum *"laborare est orare"* might aptly be used to characterize the prevailing idea of work in this period of history.

Following the Protestant Revolt, however, which rejected generally the contemplative spirit of the Middle Ages for a life of action, the idea of work took on a new significance in the eyes of the common man. By equating practical success with supernatural predestination, the new religious forces actually raised human work to a status it had never before enjoyed.[15] Furthermore, as the technological and industrial revolutions gathered momentum, this zeal for labor and distaste for leisure or inactivity in any form, greatly benefitted the rising capitalistic society and in no small way accounted for its success. As man has become increasingly absorbed in the making of artificial things, work has accordingly become more and more the very center of his life until today the world is dominated by the two states in which the idea of work is held in the highest esteem. For the Communists man exists for his work alone; for the Americans enraptured as they are with material goods, work in the sense of feverish activity for material gain has become the great "American Sin." The tragedy lies in this: that in each of these states only the materialistic concept of work prevails while the spiritual value of man's labor is ignored.

Recalling the definition of duty given above as an obligation to another implying a relation to a given act — in this case to work, we shall now establish that this duty is incumbent upon man both in his individual nature and as he is a member of society.

Throughout history it has been common for man to view work as something undesirable and, in fact, unnatural to him. Nothing could be further from the truth, and it is this failure to recognize the cause of the undesirable features of labor that has done so much to destroy the dignity of the worker and the value of his work. The opening chapter of Genesis tells us that man was made "to take command of the fishes in the sea, and all that flies through the air, and all the living things that move on the earth."[16] Subsequently, after God had made Adam, He took him "and

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[14] Etienne Borne and Francois Henry, *A Philosophy of Work,* transl. by Francis Jackson (London: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 45.

[15] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926), p. 241.

[16] Gen. 1:28, Knox translation.

put him in his garden of delight, to cultivate and tend it."[17] Thus, throughout the time before the Fall, our first parents were called upon to work by their very nature. They had an obligation both to God, as their creator, and to each other to sustain their individual lives through the natural exercise of their distinctly human powers and faculties. Such work as they did, however, (no doubt chiefly agricultural) certainly was not a cause of pain or fatigue for them, but, on the contrary, was pleasant in view of man's superior knowledge of the powers of nature.[18] Only with original sin did work take on the irksomeness and pain that has plagued man ever since, for then God again commanded man to work, this time with toil and by the sweat of his brow.[19]

It must not be thought, however, in view of the above, that man's duty to work can be proved only by a theological argument from Sacred Scripture. That this is not so will now be demonstrated.

St. Thomas teaches that man's duty to work is based fundamentally on precepts both of the natural and of positive law.[20] It is commonly agreed that the principal purpose of work is to attain the necessities of life: food, clothing, shelter, and their allied requirements. For all animated nature beneath man, however, the needs of life are few and the means to satisfy them are provided naturally and readily, since their faculties develop rapidly and without any conscious effort. Indeed, such things are moved immediately by instinct to do what is necessary to sustain life. Man, on the other hand, is not so completely cared for by nature. He is born a creature of many needs and with no immediate ability to satisfy them. Yet man alone is endowed with reason, and it is through the exercise of this faculty in conjunction with the use of his hands and body that he can obtain all that is needed for life, for, as St. Thomas points out, the hands when directed by reason are naturally ordained to a multiplicity of operations.[21] Hence it can be stated that man in view of his needs has the moral obligation to work, an obligation that is rooted in the natural and positive law and which can easily be reduced to the precept "thou shalt not kill," for no man has the right to take his own life.[22]

Two obvious objections arise to this solution: (1) Man might secure what is necessary for life by illicit means without working; and (2) man might licitly possess all he needs for sustaining life without working. To these objections St. Thomas offers ready answers. In the first case, the employment of any illicit means for attaining the necessities of life is obviously an infringement of the precept "thou shalt not steal,"

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[17] Gen. 2:15, Knox translation.
[18] St. Thomas, *Super II Librum Sententiarum*, d. 17, q. 3, a. 2, ad 7.
[19] Gen. 3:19.
[20] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 187, a. 3; *Quodlibet*, VII, a. 17.
[21] St. Thomas *Contra Impugantes Dei Cultum et Religionem*, c. 5, ad 1.
[22] *Quodlibet*, VII, a. 17, ad. 2.

and therefore contrary to the natural law.[23] In answer to the second objection, St. Thomas clearly indicates that such a person would not be bound to work under either of the precepts stated above, for work is of precept only in so far as it is necessary to attain the end, that is, to sustain life.[24] In such a case, however, the person would not be entirely dispensed from some kind of labor or useful occupation, for he could not spend his life in idleness and pleasure seeking. Consequently, the society playboy or wandering bum who has no useful occupation, but delights only in idleness, sense pleasures, or vain exploits, is contradicting nature and acting immorally.[25]

It must not be thought, however, that the duty to work is imposed on man solely that he may gain the necessities of life itself. This would act to limit severely the value of work and consequently to diminish greatly the dignity it confers on the worker. The end of man as a rational animal is not merely to live but to live according to his nature, that is, he must strive to perfect his intellect in the knowledge of truth and his will in the path of virtue. Work can be of the greatest help in the accomplishment of this difficult task, for besides acting to sustain man's life work serves in addition (1) to free man from idleness and occasions of vice, (2) to help him subject his lower appetites to reason, and (3) to provide him with the means for helping his neighbor.[26] It is true that each of these ends can be obtained by other means, and for that reason it is not because of them that man is bound to work. Considering the manner in which society has developed in all ages, however, man generally has had to spend so much of his time working to sustain life that he has been little able to avail himself of other means of perfecting his nature outside of his work. Even today, in our highly advanced age of technological progress, the average American laborer still spends far more time working than he does in any other human pursuit, and throughout the rest of the world an even larger proportion of the common man's wakeful hours are spent at his work.

Consequently, as man can attain his ultimate perfection only by performing good human acts, that is, by practicing both the intellectual and moral virtues,[27] it seems quite necessary that he use his actions as a worker effectively to bring about this desired end. St. Ambrose long ago recognized the value of man's labor in this regard when he asserted, "Without labor there is no virtue because labor is the pathway of virtue."[28] Now considering his intellectual development, the laborer, because of his immediate contact with nature as the subject matter of his work, is

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[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Contra Impugnantes*, c. 5, ad 1.

[25] A. Janssen, "Doctrina S. Thomae de obligatione laborandi," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, I (1924), p. 364.

[26] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 187, a. 3.

[27] St. Thomas, *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 15.

[28] "Nulla enim sine labore virtus, quia labor processus virtutis est." (St. Ambrose *De Cain et Abel*, Migne, PL, XIV, 209).

opportunely situated to grasp more firmly a knowledge of the truth that lies hidden in all of creation. By his efforts to refashion and dominate nature man is, in a sense, imaging the divine Creator, and from this knowledge of sensible things he can, under proper direction and circumstances, rise to the attainment in varying degrees of the intellectual virtues of knowledge, science, wisdom, and art.

Likewise, the nature of work is such that it provides the working-man with excellent opportunities for developing the cardinal moral virtues and all their subsidiary parts. Today, in our age of specialization and extreme division of labor, there is little work done by a single man acting independently of others. Rather, the common practice is for many to be employed in close association, a condition which not only facilitates greater production of goods for society but serves also to perfect the social nature of the worker himself.

Thus far man's duty to work has been viewed in relation to the needs of the worker as an individual. This, however, is not the limit of the obligation to toil because, in addition to the personal duty imposed on man, there is also a further responsibility to society in general. The initial social obligation of man is, of course, to provide for the needs of his family. If those things necessary to maintain his family in a fitting manner are not attainable by any other licit means, then man has a duty to provide for them through his labor.[29]

Finally, as a social being, man has a duty toward his fellowmen which in most cases can be discharged only through his labor. Each member of society in order to live and live well needs many things which he cannot obtain without the help of his neighbor.[30] Thus man while working for himself at the same time works for society, because any particular good procured by man is also ordained as a means to the end of the common good.[31] Likewise, man, seeking his own perfection through his labor, simultaneously labors for others since as a part of society he always labors for the perfection of the whole.[32]

It follows, moreover, that since each man has been given special talents by God, he must exercise these gifts for the benefit of society and not regard them solely as his own possession. Concerning this, St. Thomas says:

> For as many things are needed for man's livelihood, for which one man is not sufficient by himself, it is necessary for different things to be done by different men: for instance, that some cultivate the land, that some have charge of animals, that some build houses, and so forth . . . This division of divers duties among divers persons is made by divine providence, according as some are more inclined to one duty than to others.[33]

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[29] Sylvester M. Killeen, O. Praem., *The Philosophy of Labor According to Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 1939), p. 90.

[30] *Contra Impugnantes*, c. 5, ad 1.

[31] *De Regimine Principum*, I, c. 15.

[32] A. Janssen, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

[33] *Contra Gen.* (English Dominicans' transl., London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, Ltd., 1928), III, c. 134.

Viewed in this the Christian way, work becomes something more than a burden merely to be endured with resignation; it now assumes the dignity of a special calling — a vocation. Almighty God has a specific purpose for creating every individual man. He has fitted each one with particular talents, placed him in a definite moment of history, and then commanded that he serve Him in this world with his whole soul, his whole mind, and his whole strength. Each man's salvation hinges in no small way on his obedience to this command.

Still another reason for the social nature of work is that the earth with its immeasurable riches has been assigned to man for his use in attaining a perfect life. There is little, however, that man as an individual can do to conquer and utilize these immense resources of nature, and so in all ages man has recognized the social character of his work and has united with his fellowmen to produce the great works that are necessary or desirable in order that each person might develop his life to its full perfection. Work is, as it were, both a cause and an effect of civilization. Through the work of men new inventions are being developed constantly which not only cause an advance in the art of human living, but serve also to provide the additional leisure time needed for any society to grow in charity and truth. On the other hand, as an effect of this cultural progress, new needs arise in the society which broaden the sphere of work and make each contributing member increasingly dependent upon his fellow workers.[34]

In the brief consideration of the term "right" given above, mention was made of the twofold meaning of the term, that is, objective and subjective right. Here, in our treatment of man's right to work, we shall use each of these terms in its restricted meaning. Reference, therefore, to those material things which must properly be made available to the worker so that he can work will denote the objective right. On the other hand, the specification of the worker's claim to the use of these goods will signify his subjective right to work.

The question of a worker's right to work is of comparatively recent origin. Until the advent of modern industrial society, man generally was in sufficient contact with the factors of production to insure at least his own subsistence. Then too, in the early ages of man's history, the idea of work was, for the most part, viewed with contempt, and consequently little or no effort was made to establish a right to such a servile calling. Likewise, in medieval Europe, the common man was so intimately bound to the land through the manorial system of land tenure that here too there never arose a need for him to develop his right to those material goods necessary for his sustenance and development.[35] As the feudal system broke down, however, and gradually gave way to

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[34] Borne and Henry, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-98.

[35] Bede Jarrett, O.P., *Social Theories of the Middle Ages* (Westminster, Md.: Newman Book Shop, 1942), p. 138.

an economy founded on a money and capital exchange, the worker's security became increasingly less certain. His precarious position relative to the materials needed for his work was sorely aggravated by the ever greater breach developing between the entrepreneur and the worker as a result of the Industrial Revolution, a situation which to this day is the cause of much social unrest. Today a man must seek his work; he is no longer surrounded by it.

In the definition of work established above, it was stated that work consists essentially in the modification of matter by human actions. Now in view of the duty man has of working, it must follow that he has a corresponding right to the matter necessary for it; otherwise he would be incapable of satisfying his obligation. St. Thomas states that man has a natural dominion over the external goods of nature as they were made on his account, and because, by the application of his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit.[36] The Angelic Doctor, however, carefully distinguishes this community of goods, and, in doing so, establishes that man has an individual right to *ownership* of external goods but not to their unrestricted *use*. In regard to the latter, he must always be ready to communicate them to others in their need.[37] What greater need is there than life?

Furthermore, man's right to subsist from the earth through his work does not mean that he is to be allowed to take only as much as is needed for him barely to live, but rather he is to be provided sufficient opportunity to earn a decent livelihood, which, according to a foremost authority, would include such items as:

> food, clothing, and housing sufficient in quantity and quality to maintain the worker in normal health, in elementary comfort, and in an environment suitable to the protection of morality and religion; sufficient provision for the future to bring elementary contentment, and security against sickness, accident, and invalidity; and sufficient opportunities of recreation, social intercourse, education, and church-membership to conserve health and strength and to render possible in some degree the exercise of the higher faculties.[38]

In heeding this right of the workers to the use of property for their work, the owners of the factors of production are also obliged to consider as far as possible the humanity of the worker. Thus the worker must not be treated as a mere tool, nor may he be placed in proximate occasions of sin either because of the material conditions surrounding him or by reason of the excessive fatigue or monotony of his work.[39] Finally, the worker should be kept in contact with the social character of his work through an awareness of the ultimate usefulness of the product of his toil. In summation, it is the duty of both the laborer and the proprietor

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[36] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, p. 66, a. 1.
[37] *Ibid.*, a.2.
[38] John A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice* (Rev. ed., New York: Macmillan Company, 1927), pp. 319-20.
[39] Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, May 15, 1931; transl. *Reorganization of Social Economy* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1936-37), No. 135. p. 437.

to see that the whole being of the worker is moderately engrossed in his work for, in the words of Pope Pius XI, "what else is work but the application of one's forces of soul and body to these gifts of nature for the development of one's powers by their means?"[40]

Just as the duty to work has both its individual and social implications, so too the right to work can be examined from each of these viewpoints. In the paragraphs above the worker's right of access to the material needed for his labor was considered in so far as it pertained to the individual owner of property. It remains then to review briefly the social significance of the laborer's right to work.

The end of the state according to Catholic political philosophy is the common good of the community, that is, the virtuous life of its citizens in an environment of material prosperity. From this it follows that the state has the power to enforce such legislation as is needed to attain this end always providing, of course, that it does not in anyway contravene the natural law. It is clearly recognized, therefore, that the state, acting under its proper authority, has the duty to control the use of private property when such action is necessary in the interest of the public good.[41] Hence, at times of civic crisis and unemployment, the state certainly has the duty to stimulate industry and employment by demanding that access be given the workers to the materials necessary for work. Also, the state has the definite duty to assist the laborer in securing satisfactory working conditions and adequate compensation for his work should the private owners fail in their obligation in this regard, since the individual attainment of these means bears an intimate relation to the promotion of the common good and national prosperity.

It is encouraging to note that the full social significance of this principle of man's right to work has recently received special recognition on both the international and national scenes. On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations formally adopted a "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" which included the "right to work" as one of its basic articles. On the national level, the Catholic hierarchy of the United States in their annual statement for 1953 on the "Dignity of Man" specifically mentioned the importance of man's work. In this clear and concise document which sets forth the primary Catholic social teachings, special emphasis was accorded the role of human labor in supporting man's dignity as a person and uniting him with his fellowmen and all of nature in his return to God.[42]

In conclusion, a few general observations can be drawn from the above brief analysis of the nature of work and its relation to the perfecting

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[40] *Ibid.*, No. 53, p. 415.

[41] Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, May 15, 1891, transl. *Reorganization of Social Economy* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1936-37), No. 35, p. 387.

[42] "Dignity of Man," Annual Statement of the United States Hierarchy, November 21, 1953. *Catholic Mind*, LII, No. 1094, Feb., 1954, p. 127.

of man. Today, in an age when a growing segment of the world is being dedicated to a culture of "total work," it is of paramount importance that the true meaning of man's work be made known to our laboring classes. Man has a definite duty to work that is rooted in his very nature, both in its individual and social aspects. The laborer's recognition of this duty and his awareness of the value of his work will provide him with invaluable means for attaining his natural perfection, that is, a virtuous life in an environment of ample material goods. Likewise, the correlative acknowledgment of man's right to work on the part of his fellowmen and society in general will contribute noticeably to a better realization of the common good throughout the political society. Human work, however, must never become the end of life, but must always be viewed only as a most efficacious means for the development of a truly Christian society based on a social charity that will lead all men to a greater knowledge and love of God, their only true end.

Gregory Moore, O.P.

# ATHLETICS AND ATHLETICISM

**THREE YEARS AGO** sports loving Americans were rudely shocked when members of the country's top collegiate basketball teams pleaded guilty to charges of accepting bribes to fix games. These scandals brought into the open a problem that had been growing for the past twenty-five years. The whole collegiate athletic program was soon being called into question. Under such intense national scrutiny the evils of college athletics were given great publicity and were pointed to with hurt surprise and dismay. But collegiate athletics were not without many who came to its defense, extolling the benefits of amateur college sports, and showing the moral casualties of such activities to be few in number. Notwithstanding the unusual public interest in this serious problem, the battle concerning athletics in colleges has continued with few appreciable results in the field of moral conclusions.

We shall attempt to reach the heart of the collegiate athletic problem by studying the athletic programs of some of the nation's larger schools and universities in the light of the principles that should govern these programs. The present study seeks to answer questions of the morality of present day college athletic programs. More concisely: is athleticism immoral?

There can be no doubt that a real problem exists in collegiate sports. For the past quarter century educators and athletic coaches have deplored over-emphasis and commercialism in sports. Acting in groups and individually, they have taken some steps to overcome the abuses; but the problem remains at present unsolved, a profitable eyesore on the nation's educational scene.

As far back as 1929 the Carnegie Report on American Education cast a note of warning by pointing out that many colleges were accepting students without proper high school qualifications. This report also stated that colleges were violating the amateur athletic code by paying athletes to compete on teams representing the school. This warning went unheard. Again in 1947, the National Collegiate Athletic Association

approved a Sanity Code designed to "de-emphasize college sports" by limiting the extent of athletic recruiting and subsidization. There followed two years of complete disregard for the rules laid down by this code; in 1949 it was declared unenforceable and was repealed.[1]

In 1952 the American Council of Education, comprising the presidents of 979 institutions of higher learning, appointed a special committee of ten college presidents to make recommendations for "the elimination of the vices and evils existing in inter-collegiate sport." This committee advised that: athletic scholarships be abolished; postseason bowl games be eliminated; athletic recruiting be prohibited; athletes be required to make normal qualitative and quantitative progress toward a degree.[2]

These recommendations were approved by the N.C.A.A. But approval of the plan did not result in its being put into practice. As recently as January of this year, athletic coaches agreed at a national convention to limit their recruiting practices. Writing in his *Chicago Tribune* sports column one week later, Arch Ward indicated that he was not surprised to see the results of this agreement.[3] He had met only three coaches who were still hunting talent from morning to night; but he had only talked to three since the convention.

The problem has grown through the years; in some schools it is a case of the tail wagging the dog. It seems that college officials are powerless, unable to inaugurate or enforce necessary reforms. Dean Albert Kerwan of Kentucky said, "We have been at it for twenty years and I am convinced it has not worked . . . it would be a better policy if the athletic scholarships were abolished provided that other members of the conference did the same."[4]

"De-emphasis would be a good thing," said T. R. Benedeum of the Board of Regents of Oklahoma University, "but it is like disarmament, one school can't do it unless the others do."[5] Blair Cherry, former football coach at Texas University, had this to say about commercialism in

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[1] Before pronouncing sentence on the basketball players who were tried before him, the Honorable Saul Streit, presiding judge of the Court of General Sessions, New York County, made a study of the abuses in collegiate athletics and the athletic situations at the various universities for which the guilty players competed. These proceedings provide an accurate and authoritative account of the ills of the collegiate athletic world and offer concrete suggestions for reform. The first report was concerned with players from several schools in the New York City area; the second with players from Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois; and the third, with players from the University of Kentucky. The full texts of the three reports may be found in the printed proceedings of the Court of General Sessions, New York County, for November 19, 1951; December 8, 1951; and April 29, 1952; or in the New York Times of the day following. For the sake of brevity we will refer to them as the New York Report, the Bradley Report, and the Kentucky Report; page numbers given refer to the printed proceedings.
New York Report, p. 11; *New York Times,* Jan. 13, 1951.

[2] Kentucky Report, p. 51ff.

[3] *Chicago Tribune,* "In the Wake of the News", Jan. 15, 1951.

[4] Kentucky Report, p. 17.

[5] *Ibid,* p. 18.

college sports; "You have to spend more time recruiting than coaching. In the South Western Conference it is obvious football is operating on a double standard. The administration stands for this fine thing and for that; for the N.C.A.A. and for conference rules. If any cheating goes on these people don't know about it – and they don't want to know about it. I'm no longer interested in trying to please the public with a professional show to be put on by semi-pros under amateur sponsorship."[6]

Over-emphasis, commercialism; this is what educators and coaches decry. We will call it *athleticism.* The word was first used by Pius XI in the encyclical on Christian Education to denote a glorification of the body in sport.[7] It has come to signify the inter-collegiate athletic program existing in many of this country's larger colleges and universities. It is in this sense that the term athleticism will be used in this study. Since the problem of athleticism is found chiefly in basketball and football, the paper will be limited to a consideration of abuses arising from these two major activities of college athletics.

What is characteristic of the athletic problem today? Why does a problem exist in present day inter-collegiate sports? Arch Ward claims it is due to an inordinate desire to win.[8] J. Edgar Hoover said the problem arises from "a hypocritical athletic code."[9] Avery Brundage, perrenial chairman of the Amateur Athletic Union, stated that "greed for profits caused college leaders to over-emphasize."[10] Dr. George F. Cross, President of Oklahoma University, claims that over-emphasis is due to alumni pressure to produce a good team . . . "and Oklahoma is making the best of a situation that comes from demand." The coaches themselves seem to think the trouble comes from athletic scholarships and recruiting. They have passed measures against both of these in many recent meetings.

Before passing sentence on the convicted basketball players from the University of Kentucky, City College of New York, New York University, Bradley University and Long Island University, Judge Saul Streit, presiding judge of the Court of General Sessions in New York City, made an investigation of the athletic programs at these schools. He lifted the inter-collegiate sports veil and found the abuses heinous, degrading and shocking. Judge Streit's general conclusion was that the present athletic situation "can be traced directly to an inordinate desire by trustees, officials and alumni for athletic prestige and profit from sports."[12] We agree with Judge Streit's analysis of the problem. It seems that all other things mentioned as contributing to the problem in present day inter-

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[6] New York Report, p. 9.
[7] Encyclical Letter of Pius XI, "On the Christian Education of Youth", *Five Great Encyclicals,* (New York: Paulist Press, 1939), p. 50.
[8] *Chicago Tribune,* "In the Wake of the News", Jan. 15, 1951.
[9] *New York Times;* April 10, 1951.
[10] *Ibid,* Dec. 1, 1951.
[11] Kentucky Report, p. 17.
[12] *Ibid.* p. 4.

collegiate sports are directed to this end. The inordinate desire to win, the pressure from alumni, the hypocritical athletic code, the excesses in athletic scholarships and recruiting of talent, all are subordinated to the ends of athletic prestige and money.

Schools with successful athletic programs are also successful in gaining prestige and publicity. They are also successful in making money from sports events. In 1950, the University of Pennsylvania showed a net profit from football of $461,000.[13] That same year, Kentucky played to four hundred seven thousand paid admissions and grossed $1,200,000. Kentucky's basketball and football teams that year made more money and cost more to maintain than did comparable teams in the professional leagues.[14]

Some educators and athletic coaches openly admit the hope for prestige and money from inter-collegiate sports. Other college leaders only imply this hope for financial gain and national publicity. But in no case can it be presumed that the factors of prestige and money are not given careful consideration by trustees, college leaders, athletic directors and alumni. Clair Bee, basketball coach at Long Island University, said that he "considered basketball just a business venture, but well worth the investment because it gave prestige and publicity to the school."[15] At the time Mr. Bee was also a vice-president of the University. Reverend John Cavanaugh, former president of Notre Dame, indicated the school's athletic program was an auxiliary enterprise, and was helpful in defraying expenses of the school.[16]

For the purposes of this study, then, athleticism can be defined as: an inter-collegiate football or basketball program having athletic prestige and financial gain as its primary ends. In attempting to determine the morality of athleticism, this investigation must first consider what the precise function of an inter-collegiate athletic program should be. In order to do this it will be necessary to examine the entire structure of education in the light of its four causes so that the function of the part may be understood in relation to the whole.

Education is a vague term; the word comes from the Latin meaning *to lead out of.* On hearing the word, schooling or book-learning usually comes to mind. But this limits the extension of the term, for education can be used properly in reference to any activity that attempts to perfect man.

There are two ways of looking at education. In his famous encyclical on Christian Education, Pope Pius XI indicates that these two correlative viewpoints are fundamental to understanding the nature of education. One considers education from the standpoint of end; one

[13] New York Report, p. 8.
[14] *Loc. cit.*, Kentucky Report, p. 9-11.
[15] New York Report, p. 6.
[16] *New York Times,* Oct. 25, 1953.

from the standpoint of education as a process. With regard to its end, the encyclical says that education is the development of "the supernatural man, who thinks, judges, and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with right reason illumined by the supernatural light of example and teaching of Christ; in other words to use the current term, the true and finished man of character."[17] As a process, the encyclical states that education consists "essentially in preparing man for what he must be and for what he must do here below in order to attain the sublime end for which he was created."[18]

The striking feature of these statements is that education is concerned first of all with the individual. But although the goal of education centers on the individual, the process itself is social both in its cause and in its indirect effects. The individual lives and learns in an environment composed of family, Church, school, and other associates. Each of these social elements exercises some effect on the individual, and each must fulfill its educational function if the proper goal of education is to be attained.

In this regard education must be considered as a potential whole. The entire force of education is realized only when all of its separate functions are taken together; but no one role of education exhausts completely the capacity of the totality of which it is but a part.

The principles upon which education depends are extrinsic to it. There is no principle of formal unity in education itself. The only intrinsic unity of education is derived from the material object, from the subject who is to be educated. Education is not a science, not an independent instrument for human perfection; it is rather the application of two sciences upon which it depends: psychology and moral theology. The only formal unity education has is from moral theology. It alone determines in detail that to which education, as all other things, must be ordered, the truth concerning man's ultimate end.[19]

There are four causes of education. These causes must be examined briefly to throw some light on the nature and activity of the school, a subject essentially related to the study of the morality of athleticism.

The material cause of education is man. According to Pius XI, the subject of education is man, "whole and entire, soul united to body in unity of nature, with all his faculties, natural and supernatural, such as right reason and revelation show him to be."[20]

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[17] "On the Christian Education of Youth," p. 65.

[18] *Ibid.* p. 39.

[19] *Theology and Education,* by Thomas C. Donlan, O.P., (Dubuque: Brown and Co., 1952), p. 14.
The greater part of the doctrine contained in this short study of education is taken from the Encyclical Letter of Pius XI, "On the Christian Education of Youth," and from *Theology and Education,* by Thomas C. Donlan, O.P. The latter contains a detailed analysis of the Encyclical Letter in the light of the four causes.

[20] "On the Christian Education of Youth," p. 54.

Man has a twofold capacity for perfection, that due his nature and that bestowed on him through grace. The formal cause of education seeks to develop these capacities. This development is had through qualities that remove the indetermination and lack of harmony from man and endow him with the stability needed for attaining these natural and supernatural perfections. These qualities are the virtues, natural and supernatural, acquired and infused.

But what effects the union of man and the virtues? The action of many agencies enters into the efficient cause of education. But one condition is necessary before these forces can begin to exercise their proper effects – the preliminary good will of the subject himself. Once this good will is had, however, it becomes possible within certain limits for these diverse elements to direct the self-activity of the subject. The possibility of such direction is the foundation of all human educational endeavor.

Four principal agencies enter into the efficient cause of education: Church, family, state, and school. Each of these agencies has a specific function in education; but the work of one must not hinder the work of another. The cooperation of all is required for the proper function of each in effecting the perfection of the individual. This is a paramount principle in any theory of education; it is of considerable importance in the present study.

The Church has a unique place in the framework of education. In consequence of her divine mission to teach, the Church is independent of all earthly power. Hers is an independence of exercise as well as of origin; an independence of necessary and suitable means as well as of proper end. The Church has an independent right to utilize every other kind of human learning and instruction, and to determine what may help or harm the work of education. Every form of instruction is necessarily connected with man's last end. No facet of education, therefore, can be withdrawn from the light of divine law, of which the Church is guardian, interpreter, and infallible mistress.

The Church has the right to complete education. She is the only agency who can place causes from which grace and the supernatural virtues follow. The right to education in the natural moral virtues she shares with the family; the right to education in intellectual virtue she usually delegates to the school.

The family aims to complement the work of the Church in education. The family is a natural society, the Church, supernatural; but by reason of their divine institution, there is no disagreement between the two. Just as grace builds upon nature, so the Church elevates and perfects the work of the family. The family has many means to fulfill its important work as handmaid of the Church. Chief among these are instruction, command and correction. These are the means most often directed toward the primary concern of the family – the moral education of the child.

The state plays a secondary role in the education of its citizens. It must not usurp the powers of the Church or the family, and it must ensure that these powers are not unlawfully taken over by other agencies. Generally the role of the state is to protect the religious education of youth by removing public impediments that stand in the way.

The state is primarily concerned with the temporal common good. It is possible for the state to demand certain intellectual and moral qualities in all of its citizens that are helpful in attaining this common good. If Christian schools provide for this, there is no need for the state to interfere in this work. But if schools do not exist, the state has the right to establish educational institutions to promote the common good. All state established schools, therefore, will have the promotion of intellectual and moral virtue as their primary end.

The school is established to habituate students in the intellectual virtues. The specific function of the school is the inculcation of the intellectual virtues in an atmosphere of Christian piety. All activity in the school must be subject to this end. But this concern for intellectual development is not the only function of the school; it is, however, the primary function of any school.

The school is also an instrument. It is an instrument of the Church and of the family. The school cannot neglect the fostering of natural and supernatural moral virtues; by its very nature the school is an institution subsidiary and complementary to the family and Church.[21] This instrumentality results from the primary and secondary functions of the school, from the inculcation of both intellectual and moral virtues. But the school is more frequently spoken of as an instrument when considered in the light of its secondary function. In this light the school can be considered a human institution to indicate as its secondary end the rights and obligations of cultivating moral virtue.

What are these rights? What rights does the school have to participate in the fostering of moral virtue? The first right flows necessarily from the primary end of the school, from the duty to train students to acquire intellectual virtues. Certain moral dispositions are necessary as an aid to intellectual virtue. Chief among these dispositions are studiosity, perseverance, docility and recreation. These need not be virtues, but if they are, well and good. If true moral virtue is present, however, development of good intellectual habits is more easily accomplished.

Considered as a human institution, the school has as its end the moral virtues. The school attains this end in the only way possible: through instruction, motivation, delegated discipline, exhortation and example. Example is of particular importance in moral education of the young; it demands that both the school, as a moral person, and the physical persons who labor in the school, practice moral virtue.

[21] *General Education and the Liberal College,* Wm. F. Cunningham, C.S.C., (St. Louis: Herder, 1953), p. 51ff.

These, then, are the causes of education. Man, the whole man, is its material cause. The development of virtue is its formal cause. The efficient cause is a composite of Church, family, state and school. The final cause? There can be no true education which is not directed to man's last end. The ultimate reason for education is the same as for all human activity, the attainment of God in the Beatific Vision.

What is the role of athletics in the school? School athletic programs generally consist in intramural and interscholastic sports and gym classes. Gym classes emphasize muscular development through exercise; supervised sports place emphasis on competitive team games. Neither is absolutely necessary to attain the primary and secondary ends of the school. The acquiring of intellectual and moral virtue does not depend necessarily on physical exercise and competitive sports. It is true that some physical exercise and recreation is necessary for sound mental health. These need not be provided by the school in a formal program. But this is not to say that such a program has no place in the school. Considered in the light of facilitating the attainment of the ends of the school, a well-regulated athletic program is found to be necessary for attaining the ends of the school in an easier and more effective manner.

There are several reasons for this. No other matter provides such apt means of recreation as does an efficient, well-balanced athletic program. What is recreation if not an attempt to relax the soul? We relax by turning the mind from serious thought, letting it dwell on pleasant things. The antidote for mental weariness, according to St. Thomas, is some pleasure.[22] Such pleasure is had in those competitive sports whose specific function is to win. St. Thomas insists that it is naturally pleasant to win, because it makes a man appreciate his own superiority. For this reason, he further asserts that those games provide the greatest pleasure in which there is a contest for the mastery and the possibility of gaining it.[23]

Must the school athletic program always exist for the purpose of recreation or physical exercise? Investigation shows that such a program can be of use in cultivating other virtues which the school attempts to form in its students. It has been shown above that the school has a two-fold right to inculcate the moral virtues; because the moral virtues are a positive aid to intellectual virtue, and because the school can be considered as a human institution. Well-conducted competitive games are most apt for the development of moral virtue. The dispositions provided by the four moral virtues are required for active participation in competitive sports. Usually involving ten or more players, these games afford opportunities not be be found in the home to practice justice. The moderate bodily exercise had in these games is, according to St. Thomas, an apt disposition for purity.[24] The discipline of the appetites

[22] *Summa Theol.*, (Trans. by the English Dominican Fathers; New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), Ia IIae, q. 38, a. 1.
[23] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 32, a. 6, ad 3.
[24] Opusc. XVIII, *De Vita Religiosa,* ch. 9.

required in competitive sports will dispose for the virtues of temperance and fortitude and for the virtues allied to them as well. Obedience to those in charge of these games and the accepting of even minor positions on the team will be useful to the student in relations with his superiors at home or in school.

The most apt means for inculcating moral virtue by the school, then, is in the promotion of competitive sports, through intramural and intercollegiate programs. The question arises whether the intramural program is adequate in providing the goods derived from competitive sports. Is the intercollegiate athletic program, on the other hand, at all necessary? Actually, both programs can be regarded as necessary; but the distinction here is between necessity and convenience. The good ends attained by competitive sports are to be had from intramural games, but they are not gained as readily nor as effectively as from intercollegiate athletic competition.

Intercollegiate athletic teams can be a positive asset to the school. To those participating these teams afford the opportunities for moral virtue that come from competitive games. For the entire student body they provide a source of recreation, and, due to the interest which interschool contests engender, added impetus is given to the desire of all to participate in competitive sports. By the examples of courage and cooperation of team members other students are easily disposed to imitate these virtues. Piety and patriotism are also fostered; owing to a loyal interest in the team, a bond of unity is established within the student body which contributes to the harmony and peace of school life.

The established right of the school to sponsor interscholastic athletic programs can be strengthened by the consideration of certain contingent facts. These do not arise from the nature of the school itself, but, nevertheless, they do put forth strong arguments for intercollegiate sports. The student of today has more leisure time than did the student of twenty-five or fifty years ago. The urban civilization of today must provide substitutes for the chores that fell to the young people of the past two generations. These substitutes are necessary for the development of self-reliance, dependability and obedience in the young.

This paper suggests that there is no better substitute for the development of these desired characteristics than competitive interscholastic sports. If these games always have the atmosphere of play about them, they will not contribute much to the self-reliance of the participants. But when these games assume an intelligent amount of seriousness, they do assist in the development of responsibility. A young man competing for his school will realize that he is responsible for upholding the good name of the school. His example will also have a beneficial effect on others in the student body. The winning of the game will not be the most important thing in his life; but it will give him a sense of responsibility and contribute to his growth to manhood.

All phases of such an ideal athletic program are of use to the school in attaining its ends; extreme care must be exercised, however, in the use to which such programs are put. Of themselves, bodily exercise and competitive sports have no sacramental efficacy with regard to moral virtue. Participation in collegiate athletic programs does not insure moral virtue; it only provides apt matter for virtue, and to some extent it develops dispositions that are helpful in acquiring virtue. Any college athletic program must be well supervised, therefore, lest that which is intended to assist the student result instead in some harm.

Students must be given instruction on the proper emphasis to be placed on winning. The purpose of athletics in relation to the ends of the school must be explained to them. The relative value of sports in the curriculum should be upheld, but it should be constantly stressed that the school exists first of all as an intellectual agency. No athletic program should be allowed to "just grow up" in the school. It should be directed and governed; and this in such a way that the athletic program contributes to the attainment of the primary and secondary ends of the school, and in no way hinders this attainment.

What is the place of prestige and money in a well directed college athletic program? Since the school has a right to engage in athletics, it has a right to do it well. It can, therefore, seek athletic prestige. It can also pursue the means that are proper to this end, such as the hiring of good athletic coaches and concentrating on victory in its competitions with other schools. But athletic prestige can never be the primary end of a legitimate interscholastic athletic program. Of its very nature this program involves students; every program in which they participate under the auspices of the school must be directed primarily to their moral or intellectual good. Victory, then, should not be the sole criterion for judging the merit of these programs. Victory, however, does have some right to be included among the criteria; victory is an indication of a good coach, a good team, good school spirit. But the degree to which athletics contribute to the primary and secondary ends of the school is the only prudent measure of their worth.

Another by-product of a successful athletic program is money. Can the school rightfully charge admisison to its games in order to support athletics and provide for other educational facilities? This can be answered by asking an analogous question — can the school rightfully ask tuition of its students? The answer is obvious. An institution having the right to exist has also the right to pursue legitimate means to provide the necessary capital to ensure its continued existence. If spectators wish to recreate by watching college athletic contests, the college has the right to charge admission. But this can never be the legitimate primary end of an athletic program.

Both money and athletic prestige, then, have a legitimate place in the college athletic program. They are not, however, the primary ends of

this program. If such were the case, the school would lose the right to allow student participation in its athletic program. Such programs exist primarily for the perfection of the students, not for the financial support and prestige of the school.

Is athleticism, then, immoral? This question must be answered in the affirmative. Athleticism perverts the right order of things; it takes for its primary end that which should be an accident, or at most a secondary end. Money and prestige are the focal points of athleticism; the development of virtue in the students is often completely overlooked.

The immorality of athleticism can be explained in scholastic terminology. Recreation, physical exercise and apt matter for moral virtue comprise the *finis operis* of an athletic program; this is a legitimate end. The *finis operantis,* money and athletic prestige, is also legitimate. The circumstance *quis* is no source of difficulty; if the school used full-time professional athletes and not students, it could concentrate exclusively on athletic prestige and financial gain from its athletic program. The circumstance *quibus auxiliis* is where the immorality of athleticism is precisely located. An unfit instrument is used. Every program sponsored by the school which involves the participation of its students must be ordered primarily to the intellectual and moral good of the students. Athleticism is not so ordered.

In addition to the fundamental immorality found in athleticism, the means employed by some schools in practicing athleticism are directly contrary to the intellectual and moral perfection of the student; opposed to the very ends for which the school should be striving. True, the use of these means is not found in all schools that practice athleticism, nor where found, do they exist in the same degree. For this reason, these means must be considered separately.

The amount of time players spend in grueling practice and the "snap courses" they are allowed to take pervert the intellectual ends of the school. The Streit Report showed that three to four hours daily practice for basketball or football was not uncommon.[25] It wisely added that four hours of exhausing practice was hardly an apt disposition for study. In addition to this daily consumption of valuable study time, players are forced to travel all over the country and thereby miss many of their classes. One basketball player at Bradley missed thirty day of class in one semester.[26]

At the universities studied by Judge Streit, some of the courses in which athletes were enrolled were ludicrous. One student at Bradley, a major in business administration, received credit for courses in handball and basketball in his sophomore year; in baseball, volleyball and touch football in his junior year. In his senior year he was given credit

[25] Kentucky Report, p. 23.
[26] Bradley Report, p. 35.

for track and field, softball, volley ball and individual gymnastics.[27] When quizzed about his academic course, one of the Bradley students stated, "It was all play."[28]

Other universities not directly involved in the recent scandals undoubtedly employ similar means to guarantee that their players maintain scholastic standards to remain eligible for athletics. At the University of Michigan one hundred members of the faculty recently charged that a double standard was being used in crediting athletes and non-athletes.[29] At William and Mary it was revealed that high school records were altered to allow student athletes to enter the college.[30] This in a school where sixty out of a thousand, one twelfth of the student body, were on the football team and presumably on "rides."

Another detriment to study is the fact that players are forced to concentrate almost exclusively on sports. In a recent issue of *Newsweek,* Father Hesburgh, the president of Notre Dame, said that the reason Notre Dame turned down post-season games, especially a lucrative contract with the Sugar Bowl, was because " 'we feel that the education of our students is vitally involved and we cannot sacrifice that for money.' Even if a football player missed no classes, a bowl commitment meant one more month in which his mind was likely to be on nothing but football."[31] Yet Frank Leahy, former head coach at Notre Dame, stated in the same article that Notre Dame plays a "bowl game" every week. As is natural, this concentration on football does infect the student body to some extent. Thinking about football, discussing it on the campus, does not prevent students from concentrating on their studies. But when the atmosphere of a campus gives evidence that Saturday's game is the most important thing in the world, that the good name of the school demands victory, students will not give proper attention to study, and the order of values becomes effectively perverted.

The moral ends of the school also suffer from athleticism. Students and players are exposed to a moral cynicism when they see the very people from whom they should draw inspiration indulging in fraud and deception. This is, perhaps, the greatest evil of athleticism. Year after year college officials and coaches agree to use amateurs on their teams, agree not to subsidize or prosyletize. Year after year these agreements are promptly broken.

At some schools players have the potential matter of virtue turned into the practice of vice. They are urged to remove the star players of opposing teams, not by fair means, but by any means that will achieve the end. Bob Mathias, star fullback of Stanford's Rose Bowl team, stated in *Parade* magazine that he was not going to play football during his

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[29] *New York Times,* Oct. 6, 1951.
[30] *Time,* Sept. 24, 1951.
[31] *Newsweek,* Dec. 7, 1953.

senior year, "because it was no longer a sport."[32] He mentioned incidents when he "was tackled and got an extra bonus – an intentional knee in the face. He knew he could "take the rough stuff, and dish it out, too." But he felt "there was no sense continuing in the game when the whole purpose has become so confused that players try to inflict injuries on each other." A similar case is that of John Bright, the Drake star, who was removed from competition for the better part of a season because members of opposing teams thought he was too dangerous.[33]

The moral standard of college athletes is also weakened by the Booster's Club, or athletic "slush fund." These clubs, usually sponsored by local merchants and business people, "take care of the boys" and see to it that they are well provided for. Through these Booster Clubs players receive rewards for playing good games; in this way they are bribed to do something they have already been paid to do. The Booster Club is in a sense a self-appointed agency for violating the rules. It exercises open influence on college athletes while coaches and college officials close their eyes and take comfort in the fact that they are not obliged to do directly what can be done by others indirectly.

The problem of athleticism is a serious one, and it admits of no easy solution. Public scandals are not frequent, but the root causes of the scandals still exist. It is clear, however, that these causes are not found in athletics, but in the policies and actions of the schools and their administrators. Many schools make no attempt to inculcate true moral and intellectual virtue. The school officials are content with their work if the athletic department shows a profit at the end of the year and if the school's name is well spoken of in the sports page and is on every sports fan's tongue. The solution lies not in the abolition of inter-scholastic sports; the potential benefits of a well ordered program are too great to be sacrificed because of the greed and shortsightedness of a few. Rather, let educators and athletic directors realize once again the true ends of education. Let them order all the schools activities to these ends. Then, and only then, will athleticism be destroyed and athletics restored to its rightful place in the educational system.

Kevin D. O'Rourke, O.P.

[32] *Parade*, August 16, 1953; Associated Press Dispatch, *The Houston Chronicle*, August 16, 1953.
[33] *New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1951.

# LEO XIII AND THE SCRIPTURES

THAT UNITY WHICH SO CLEARLY IDENTIFIES THE CHURCH of Christ, especially in the midst of the anarchic intellectual and political atmosphere of our own day, has found singular expression in the teachings of the last five pontiffs, who have courageously guided the Catholic mind through the morass of contempory materialism and rank naturalism. Echoing the prayer of Christ that all may be one, the popes, one after another, have taken up the principles and policies of their predecessors and with a remarkable singleness of purpose.

Nowhere is this more manifest than in the domains of philosophy and theology. In the latter science one of the brightest ornaments of the papacy over the last eighty years has been the concerted effort of the popes to foster and advance the study of Sacred Scripture within the Church, "so that she never required, nor does she now require, any stimulation from without."[1]

At the time of Leo XIII, however, even within the Church, considerable confusion was upsetting the traditional Catholic solidarity and threatening to destroy the very foundation of the Faith. Into this turmoil the pope sent the document which may well be called the *Magna Charta* of scriptural research – the magnificent encyclical *Providentissimus Deus,* issued on November 18, 1893.

Since that time progress made by Catholic scholars in the field of Biblical studies has been, in many respects, unique in the history of the Church. Not only has the Word of God come to be better known and loved by the Christian people, but it has also regained the respect of fair-minded men everywhere. The brilliant trilogy of encyclicals dealing with scriptural studies, and which are led by Leo XIII's *Providentissimus Deus,* provide us with a measuring rod of this progress. After this initial impetus an even deeper penetration into the essential problems which faced Catholic exegetes was developed. This fuller wisdom found

[1] Leo XIII, *Providentissimus Deus* (Nov. 18, 1893), p. 10. The translation and page numbers are taken from *Rome and the Study of Scripture* (St. Meinrad: Grail, 1946).

beautiful, as well as a soundly theological, expression in the *Spiritus Paraclitus* of Benedict XV, on September 15, 1920. The theme here included an urgent warning to all Catholic scholars to remain firm in the unchangeable Catholic tradition, especially as voiced in the writings of Saint Jerome, the Church's greatest Doctor in the explanation of the Scriptures. Finally, Pope Pius XII rendered theology and all the faithful a crowning service in his definitive *Divino Afflante Spiritu* of September 30, 1943.

These three encyclicals are not just monuments of scholarship. They constitute a substantial part of the apostolic plan of the Church "to restore all things in Christ." Giving us, as they do, a cohesive, integrated program for promoting the study of the Bible, they cannot be neglected without grave detriment to the formation of a unified view of the universal vision of the Church. The same popes who have pleaded for social justice, championed Catholic Action, and laid the foundation of every aspect of the modern apostolate, have also shown, both in these three encyclicals and in innumerable other concrete measures, the necessity for constant application to study of the Word of God.

Our purpose here is to treat the first of these encyclicals, the *Providentissimus Deus.* By studying the rationalistic atmosphere into which it was introduced, we will see how the wisdom of Leo XIII slowly but definitively emerged from the crisis respected and, what is much more important, accepted as a normative guide in future research.

The most cursory knowledge of Judaeo-Christian thought could not but leave one convinced that Sacred Scripture, the inspired Word of God, was the very fiber of its origin and development. In the days of the Jewish nation the Bible was not only the national heritage, but it contained what was probably the totality of Jewish literary ambition. This heritage found ready acceptance in our own era, the Scriptures becoming the object of the writings and preaching of the Fathers.

For the Middle Ages this veneration of the Word of God took the form of lengthy commentaries, and provided the elements for the elaboration of scholastic theology. After the Council of Trent the "golden age" of scriptural exegesis saw the rising glory of some of the "names" in positive theology.

But it took the subjectivistic jugglers of the nineteenth century to assert boldly that two thousand years and an untold number of saintly scholars had really scattered the treasures contained in the Bible. From the first idle theories of isolated rationalists to the clamorous unity of anti-supernaturalism in the latter part of the century, only one objective remained more or less clear – to destroy the supernatural by destroying its principles. To the rationalists this meant the Bible, the Church, and even Faith itself.

The Church had withstood many such enemies before. But particularly trying at first in this new crisis was the fact that the effects of the "lay

dogma," as Ricciotti calls it, were creeping insidiously into even Catholic ranks and were evident among highly placed clerics.

Pope Pius X, making a clear delineation of the doctrines of modernism, held even by so-called liberal Catholics, demonstrated the relationship between rationalism and "the synthesis of all heresies" in which the rationalists found their most valuable ally.

> Nor indeed would one be wrong in regarding them [the modernists and rationalists] as the most pernicious of all the adversaries of the Church. For as we have said, they put into operation their designs for her undoing, not from without but from within. Hence, the danger is present almost in the very veins and heart of the Church, whose injury is the more certain from the very fact that their knowledge of her is the more intimate. They lay the axe . . . to the very root, that is, to the faith and its deepest fibers. And once having struck at this root of immortality, they proceed to diffuse poison through the whole tree, so that there is no part of Catholic truth which they leave untouched, none that they do not strive to corrupt.[2]

Pius X credits their audacity to ignorance both of Catholic tradition and of scholastic, i.e., Thomistic, philosophy and theology. Coupled with this he finds a vain curiosity over novelties and a consummate pride. This frame of mind was particularly obvious in the domain of scriptural studies, for a successful attack directed at the Old and New Testaments would destroy the very foundation upon which the supernatural edifice of the Church had been built.

The first step in such a plan would be to undermine the doctrine of inspiration and inerrancy of the Sacred Books. To this end theology, philosophy, and science, both certain and merely hypothetical, were perverted.

The Vatican Council, clarifying several canons of Trent, had explicitly anathematized two prevalent opinions concerning the inspired character of the Bible. It condemned those who maintained that inspiration followed approval by the Church of simply human productions. Against others, it declared that inspiration does not mean that the Bible contained revelation without error.

The Council then goes on to define that the Books of the Bible are inspired and canonical because, written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God for their author and as such were given to the Church.

Finally, it was reaffirmed, as tradition had already frequently done, that the living Church herself is the supreme rule of interpretation of the Bible, and that all who contravene the sense she determines set themselves against the Faith itself.[3]

This, then, is the explicit teaching against which the rationalists pitted their strength. Catholics everywhere accepted these decrees. Difficul-

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[2] Pius X, *Pascendi* (English translation published by the Catholic Truth Society: London, 1937), p. 8.

[3] Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, nn. 1787 and 1788.

ties arose from them, when, acting (not always maliciously) upon the principles of rationalism and the "lay dogma," and, lacking the solid theological and philosophical training, they sought to analyze these definitions and to bring them into harmony with false principles.

According to them the conclusions of modern science proved beyond doubt that the Bible was full of errors, exaggerations, myths, and contradictions. In an effort to find some rapprochement between the inspired and inerrant character of the Scripture and the hypotheses of science, Catholics searched quite frantically for some cover-all compromise.

> As the authority of the higher critics kept growing apace, the general problem appeared thus to some Catholic scholars: How can errors in the Bible be reconciled with its inspiration?
>
> The vast majority of Catholic theologians denied flatly that there were any errors in the Bible as written originally, and therefore contended that the problem was worded wrongly. But, a few, less familiar with Catholic Tradition, admitted the problem as formulated.[4]

These erroneous solutions can be summarized as follows:

> Some said that *not all things* in the Bible were inspired; errors could then be allowed in those things which were not written under divine inspiration. Others held on to the traditional doctrine of plenary inspiration, but distinguished various *degrees of inspiration,* with the lowest of which error was not incompatible. A third opinion distinguished between *revelation* and *inspiration,* the latter not guaranteeing inerrancy.[5]

In this state of affairs the need for a definitive guide was imperative. In order to accomplish his plan for the reform of the Church, Leo XIII realized the absolute necessity of meeting these exigencies of the day.

The main objective of the encyclical, the restoration of theological balance to the distorted views of the critics, was best served by a clear definition of the nature of inspiration; at least, to the extent that theological speculation on the precise manner in which inspiration was accomplished might have a firm foundation.

The canonical Scriptures are referred to by the Fathers as "a Letter written by our Heavenly Father and transmitted by the sacred writers to the human race in its pilgrimage so far from its heavenly country."[6] They are the words of God Himself, telling us of his wonderous mysteries, counsels, and works. In them we possess a most fruitful source of Sacred Theology, a bulwark of defence, and an impetus to sanctity.

Obviously the Scriptures cannot be handled as human things; they must not be subjected to the vagaries of human reason. God speaks, and only God understands. In His way, according to His determination we are to seek understanding.

Conscious, as he was of the nature of this crisis, Leo XIII saw how he must restore proper perspective to the natural and supernatural — how

[4] A. C. Cotter, S. J., "The Antecedents of Providentissimus Deus," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* V (April, 1943), p. 118.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 124.
[6] *Providentissimus,* p. 2.

he must humble, and yet save, the minds and souls of the erring. Boldly, the Church is set forth as the perfect and objective criterion for men of the true sense of the Scriptures.

To illustrate the manner in which the Church, speaking through her saints and doctors, fulfilled her noble task as guardian and interpreter of the Scriptures, the pope briefly reviews the glorious tradition of exegesis within the Church over the nineteen centuries of her existence.

The magisterium of the Church "by admirable laws and regulations, has always shown itself solicitous that the celestial treasure of the sacred books, so bountifully bestowed upon man by the Holy Spirit, should not lie neglected."[7] These admonitions and laws affected the daily office, the official prayers of the Liturgy, the preaching of the Word of God, and the scientific study of the Bible in institutions of higher learning for the clergy and laity.

In order to indicate precisely the mind of the Church in these matters the pope outlines the entire course of scriptural study to be pursued, stressing, as he prepares to launch into the heart of the "biblical problem," the dangers of the rationalistic principles which have surreptitiously crept into even Catholic circles. These errors have found a breeding place in those "who, notwithstanding their impious opinions and utterances about God, Christ, the Gospels and the rest of Holy Scripture, would fain be considered theologians and Christians, and who attempt to disguise by such an honorable name their rashness and their pride."[8]

Thus, in order to avoid the frailties of human reason, the pope reaffirms the common patristic tradition that the ardor and earnestness of investigations into the obscurity of the Bible must be guided always by the teaching authority of the living Church. "Where the **charismata** [in this case, inspiration] of God are, there the truth is to be learned, and the Holy Scripture is safely interpreted by those who have the apostolic succession."[9] The Council of Trent declares "that is the true sense of Holy Scripture, which has been held and is held by our Holy Mother the Church, whose place it is to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures."[10]

Having established the only solid foundation for true progress in these studies, the pope faces squarely the problem which confronts the Catholic exegete in the light of the conclusions of modern experimental and historical sciences.

Uncompromisingly the Church demands recognition of her living and proper magisterium without which it is impossible to maintain the full authority of the Bible. Catholic scholars are not to concede the field of battle to their opponents by accepting new "theories" uncritically. Every

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 6.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[9] St. Irenaeus, *Contra Haereses,* IV, 26, 5.
[10] *Providentissimus,* p. 14.

conceivable approach open to the enemy must be closed by self-sacrificing efforts on the part of the defenders. The attacks may come by use of critical methods, especially the so-called higher criticism; they may come from researches into the many oriental cultures, their languages, customs, and historical influence; or they may come from the proponents of the natural sciences and historical criticism. In each of these fields we must have trained experts who, under the guidance of the Church, can test the validity of these "theories" and render them due appreciation. But never need they fear that any theory or hypothesis, however ruinous it may seem at first sight, will ever weaken the authority of the divine Scriptures. This the living Church alone can guarantee.

> Whatever they can really demonstrate to be true of physical nature we must show to be capable of reconciliation with our Scriptures, and whatever they assert in their treatises, which is contrary to these Scriptures of ours, that is, the Catholic faith, we must either prove it as well as we can to be entirely false, or at all events we must, without the smallest hesitation, believe it to be so.[11]

Expanding this concept, Pope Leo XIII asserts:

> All the books which the *Church* receives as sacred and canonical are written wholly and entirely, with all their parts, at the dictation of the Holy Ghost; and so far is it from being possible that any error can coexist with inspiration, that inspiration not only is essentially incompatable with error, but excludes it and rejects it as absolutely and necessarily as it is impossible that God Himself, the supreme Truth, can utter that which is not true.[12]

Hence, that the Bible is inspired and free of all error in its entirety, is simply and absolutely a matter of Catholic faith open to no question, no doubt, and above all, to no attack.

However, the actual *nature of inspiration* had not yet been explicitly defined. The Council of Florence had first used the term *Spiritu Sancto inspirante*, and Trent had declared the extent of this divine action. The Vatican Council defined the Sacred Books as "those books . . . which because they were written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit have God for their Author and as such were given to the Church herself."[13]

Certain questions immediately arise concerning the nature of this *authorship*. What is God's part in the composition of the Bible? What is the nature of the role played by its human authors? And how is the human author "elevated and moved" while preserving his own personality, his natural aptitudes, and his freedom?

This was to be the major achievement of Leo XIII — to define with theological precision the nature of inspiration.

> By supernatural power, He [God] so moved and impelled them [the sacred writers] to write — He so assisted them when writing — that the things which He ordered, and those only, they, first, rightly understood, then willed faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in *apt words*.[14]

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[11] St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, I, 21, 41.
[12] *Providentissimus*, p. 24.
[13] Denzinger, nn. 706, 783-784, 1787.
[14] *Providentissimus*, p. 24.

This sharply drawn definition can be explained only by a full appreciation of the Thomistic doctrine of principal and instrumental causality. It it not our purpose in this short paper to enter into a discussion of this fundamental principle. Suffice it to say that it is essential to the Thomistic synthesis, and its ramifications extend throughout the whole of theology. Neither the omnipotence of God causing all things absolutely nor the free activity of man really causing the effects proper to him is diminished by it. Both are total causes. To overstress one cause is to destroy the other.

> An instrumental cause, however, does not act in virtue of *its own form,* but only because of the movement imparted to it by the principle cause which moves it. The resultant effect reflects not so much the instrument as it does the principal agent. Not that the instruments are deprived of their forms in the sense that these forms are completely inactive and have no part in what takes place – for every instrument exercises *its own proper activity* as well as *another,* inasmuch as it operates as an instrument of a higher cause.[15]

God is the Author of the entire Bible *(Sacrae Scripturae universae),* and that down to the very words (*usque ad verba.*) When the sacred writer expresses himself, he does so truly and of his own power but always under the divine impulse or inspiration. For example, when St. Matthew relates the parables of our Lord, it is because he has heard them himself that he can relate them to others. Yet he is guided by the divine light to put down "those things and only those things which God wills, and in the way He wills."

This "light" enables the writer to judge of the events which he reports in such a way that he is actually seconded by God in every statement. But since the sacred writers were not teaching science, history or the like, they were not expected to make absolute affirmations in those orders. The Bible, intended to lead men on the way of salvation, has no need of precise scientific formulas or observations.

The encyclical in treating of those grave problems and in providing prudent guidance for future research does not leave the Bible to the manipulations of "pure science," but directs these fundamental theological considerations toward the practical progress of the Christian life to its ultimate goal. For this reason the pope points out the doctrinal, homiletic, and spiritual values of the Sacred Scriptures when he exhorts all, especially clerics and "novices of the ecclesiastical army," to steep themselves in this "arsenal of heavenly arms." This aspect finds most convincing expression in the *Spiritus Paraclitus* of Benedict XV.

The teachings of this encyclical have had a tremendous effect, and an impetus was given to Catholic scholarship which constantly gains momentum. The vast scriptural literature which has appeared since the time of Leo XIII is sufficient indication of the vitality within the Church under the wise guidance of the Holy See.

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[15] R. T. Murphy, O.P., "The Teachings of Providentissimus Deus," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly,* V (April, 1943), p. 129.

Three major developments can be mentioned here as illustrating the practical measures taken by the popes in their effort to combat error and spread the truth of Christ.

By far the most important event to follow the encyclical was the institution of the Pontifical Biblical Commission by the Apostolic Letter *Vigilantiae* on October 30, 1902. The purpose of the Commission is to promote biblical studies and to watch over their progress. Its decisions, upon approval of the Holy See, bind in conscience; to attack them either openly or secretly is deliberate disobedience and rashness, even grave fault. A unifying principle for the researches of Catholic scholars throughout the world, it forms a "federation of energies" which can lead only to more orderly and rapid advances.

The second development was the erection in quick succession of institutes of advanced biblical studies in Rome, Palestine, Fribourg, Ottawa, and Washington. In all seminaries the scripture department came into its own as an essential part of the curriculum.

Finally, in the reign of Benedict XV, upon the occasion of the fifteenth centenary of the death of St. Jerome, the encyclical *Spiritus Paraclitus* was issued. This beautiful and scholarly tribute to St. Jerome and Catholic Tradition crowned the work of Leo XIII. Together with the *Divino Afflante Spiritu* of Pius XII, this trilogy of the popes on Sacred Scripture offers both a challenge and a promise. It offers a challenge to the generosity and desire for truth of Catholics who profess to be the intellectual leaders of the Church; it offers a promise of the richest rewards in the spiritual life for all those who love the Scriptures, and who long for the full flowering of a well-directed apostolate.

Alphonsus Mainelli, O.P.

# THE VATICAN COUNCIL ON THE NATURAL LIGHT OF HUMAN REASON

**THIS IS AN AGE WHICH PRIDES ITSELF** for its achievements in science and technology, accomplishments which, in themselves, are a wonderful tribute to the restless, probing quality of the human mind. With an insatiable thirst for knowledge and an equally unlimited lust for the domination of nature, modern man has spent all his time and vital energy in the unrelenting pursuit of temporal prosperity. Instead of seeing God reflected in the cosmos about him, man, mistaking his own image for reality, has fallen down in self-adoration.

It is no exaggeration to say that a diabolical perversion has infected the world. For the vast knowledge that mankind has today about the physical universe should, in the natural order of things, lead him to a greater understanding of God. Instead, we find a devastating ignorance and crass atheism dominant among the "wise men" of the Age and their devotees. Of course this situation is not new: The Book of Wisdom proclaims:

> But all men are vain, in whom there is not knowledge of God: and who by these good things that are seen, could not understand him that is, neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman . . . For being conversant among his works, they search: and they are persuaded that the things are good which are seen. But then again they are not to be pardoned. For if they were able to know so much as to make a judgment of the world, how did they not more easily find out the Lord thereof?"[1]

The Twentieth century, then, is not unique in its ignorance. The unique element lies rather in the fact that God, Who previously had been accepted for centuries by the Christian West, and for Whose existence clear, rational proofs had been given, came, in our own times, to be rejected in the very name of reason – and by persons whose knowledge should have led them to a more profound insight into the Creator of the world.

[1] 13:1, 7-9.

Partly to counteract the spreading atheism and pernicious rationalism, and partly to correct certain dangerous opinions within the Church, the Vatican Council, on April 24, 1870, defined, along with other revealed truths, the fact that man has the radical, natural power to know God with certitude by means of the created universe.[2] In order to arrive at a better grasp of its true meaning, an analysis of the pertinent canon, principally in terms of the Acts of the Council, will be presented in the pages which follow.

That such an analysis is necessary becomes evident from the text of the canon itself. For example, it states that "our *Creator*" can be known by the natural light of reason. What precisely does this mean? Does it imply that unaided reason can arrive at a knowledge of creation in the proper sense? Furthermore, this knowledge of God's existence is *certain* according to the canon, yet, in the absence of revelation, how many men today would readily profess such certitude? Nor does history seem to substantiate the canon on this point. Finally, some men might admit the reality of a cosmic force and call this the true God. Would this satisfy the requirements of the canon? For these and for other reasons the true sense of the Canon must be made clear. A sound and basic understanding of it will be helpful not only in refuting the arguments of those who deny, or at least doubt, the truth which it enunciates but also in one's own spiritual life for creation is meant to lead men to God.

The method of procedure will be simple. After the statement of the canon and of the corresponding chapter, which partially amplifies the concise expression of the canon, the various errors will be considered which the Council corrected when it promulgated this definition. Since the canon lends itself to division into five elements, each of these will be analyzed in terms of other pertinent ecclesiastical documents and the numerous objections and modifications proposed by the Fathers of the Council.

In an undertaking such as this, perhaps the greatest danger to be avoided is the tendency to read more into the words than was intended by their authors. Care must also be taken not to assume that a particular word is being used in its technical and restricted meaning when it is being taken in its common signification. Furthermore, to evaluate the particular words employed in the canon properly, the difficult task of reconstructing the precise philosophical and theological milieu which engendered this definition and its opposing errors is essential to success. No claim is made that any or all of these obstacles have been surmounted successfully.

After undergoing several minor alterations, the final form of the canon reads, "*If any one shall say that the one true God, our Creator and*

[2] Conc. Vat., sess. III, *Constitutio Dogmatica de Fide Catholica, De Revelatione*, Can. 1; *Collectio Lacensis Conciliorum recentiorum, tome* vii, column 255c; (Henceforth all references to this *Collectio* will be made thus: *Lac.* 255c, *tome* vii being understood); Denz. 1806.

*Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason through those things that are made; let him be anathema."*[3]

The second chapter of the same Constitution corresponds to this canon:

> The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, may be certainly known by the natural light of human reason, by means of created things, 'for the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made' (Rom. 1:20); but that it pleased His wisdom and bounty to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will, to mankind by another and a supernatural way . . .[4]

An examination of the specific errors aimed at by the Council will constitute the first step in determining the precise meaning of the canon, i.e., it must be determined exactly what the Council intended to include and to exclude in the ambit of its censure. Archbishop Simor, Primate of Hungary, in the name of the Deputation for the Faith[5] pointed out in his general report to the Conciliar Fathers on the revised Schema, that the purpose of a canon is to condemn errors opposed to Catholic doctrine. Following the practice of the Council of Trent, the condemnation is generally prefaced by a positive statement (called the "Chapter") of the true teaching of the Church on the point at issue.[6] As Archbishop Simor

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[3] Si quis Dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse: anathema sit." *Ibid.;* Dom Cuthbert Butler gives the following translation taken from Cardinal Manning's Letter of October, 1870, *The Vatican Council:* "If any one shall say that the One true God, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certianly known by the natural light of human reason through created things; let him be anathema." *The Vatican Council* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), Vol. 2, p. 269; Cf. p. 247. The difference between the two translations falls on the Latin, "per ea, quae facta sunt." For the purposes of this paper it seemed advisable to the present author to employ a more literal rendering of the phrase, not withstanding the very slight modification in meaning.

[4] Butler, *op. cit.,* Vol. 2, p. 255; "Eadem sancta mater Ecclesia tenet et docet, Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis certo cognosci posse; invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspisciuntur: (Rom. 1:20) attamen placuisse ejus sapientiae et bonitati, alia, eaque supernaturali via, se ipsum ac aeterna voluntatis suae decreta humano generi revelare . . ." *Lac.,* 250d; Denz. 1785.

[5] The *Deputatio de Fide* was one of the four special Congregations, or committees, composed of twenty-four members elected by secret ballot from the bosom of the Council and presided over by a Cardinal appointed by the Pope. To these committees were sent the various amendments and objections of the attending prelates to the matters proposed to them for consideration. These suggestions were discussed thoroughly by the committee, i.e. the Deputation, and a written report of their deliberations sent to the Council. A spokesman from among the committee members was designated to present orally the recommendations of the Deputation to the Fathers. Finally each of the proposed amendments were voted upon by the whole Council and, if passed by a majority, was incorporated into the final decree to be accepted and promulgated by the Pope at a Public Session. Cf. *Lac.,* 22d-24a; Butler, *op. cit.,* vol. 1, p. 158-9; *Catholic Encyclopedia,* "Vatican."

[6] Cf. "Cum, Rmi. Patres, postulaveritis ut propositae doctrinae catholicae adjicerentur canones, atque in hisce canonibus errores oppositi doctrinae catholicae condemnarentur, habetis canones in hocce schemate. Nihil difficilius est quam canonem condere: in hisce canonibus condendis Deputatio summam adhibuit solertiam et diligentiam, primum ideo ne plus diceret quam dicere oportuit . . ." *Lac.,* 84d. "Sed quia vestrum, Rmi. Patres, illud postulatum fuit, ut in hoc Concilio Vaticano procederetur ad hunc morem, sicut processit concilium Tridentinum in specie, nimirum ut primo doctrina Ecclesiae proponeretur, deinde autem adjungerentur canones, in quibus condemnarentur oppositi catholicae errores . . ." *Lac.,* 83c.

explained, a truth in the peaceful possession of the Faithful has no need to be defined. Even when the Church does finally define a particular truth, She does not say more than is necessary.[7]

What error, then, was the Church reproving by this definition? According to the observations made by the Deputation for the Faith and attached to the Schema presented to the Conciliar Fathers, this canon and its corresponding chapter were necessary not only because of Traditionalism, but also because of the widespread error that the existence of God cannot be proved by solid arguments or known by the human reason with certitude.[8] The whole Constitution, in fact, as it was finally promulgated, is concerned with fundamentals – with God as the Creator, Revelation, Faith, and the relationship between Faith and Reason. The tenor of Cardinal Rauscher's criticism of the original Schema brings out the mind of the Council:

> . . . it is not now, as it was at Trent, a question of heresies, but of the very foundation of belief and religion; what is needed is a decree of a General Council condemning current errors, not a resume of dogma for the use of professors of theology.[9]

The Cardinal's keen realization of the burden confronting the Council was decisive and the Schema was revised accordingly. It is in this context that the present canon must be viewed.

Traditionalism in its *rigid* or *extreme form* is generally understood to include the notion that ". . . man would not have been able to know any truth without the divine Revelation made to Adam and transmitted down to us."[10] "In a *mitigated form* the Traditionalists deny to human reason only the capacity of arriving at the truths of the ethico-religious order."[11] The question naturally arises as to which form of Traditionalism is under consideration here. Even a cursory reading of the canon and the chapters reveals that the whole concern of the Council in this matter is with the existence of God and not with all truths naturally knowable.

This question is not resolved immediately by the explicatory notes provided by the board of consulting theologians who assisted in drafting the decrees. In their discussion of Traditionalism they quote the words of Bautain and Lamennais, two of the principal Traditionalists,[12] as examples of this error.[13] Bautain was classified by Thonnard[14] as a semi-

[7] Cf. ". . . scitis enim quod Ecclesia catholica numquam dogmata vel in conciliis definiat nisi sit necessarium. Quousque dogmata in pacifica possessione sunt, illo usque Ecclesia nihil definit; sufficit modus ordinarius credendi, profitendi, custodiendi, conservandi illibate doctrinam catholicam. Ergo ne plus diceretur quam necessarium sit." *Lac.*, 84d-85a.

[8] *Lac.*, 79c; Cf., *Lac.* 86c.

[9] Butler, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 188.

[10] Pietro Parente, Antonio Piolanti & Salvatore Garofalo, *Dictionary of Dogmatic Theology*, (trans. by Emmanuel Doronzo from the 2nd. Italian ed., Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1951), p. 285.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Lac.*, 520d-521a.

[14] *Précis d'Histoire de la Philosophie* (2nd ed., Tournai: Desclée & Cie., 1946), p. 685.

traditionalist, that is, one who holds that Revelation is necessary to "discover" the truth, but that afterwards reason can demonstrate the same truth. On the other hand, Lamennais, a Traditionalist in the full sense of the term, held that the individual reason is not capable of attaining to truth; the universal consent of mankind, however, received by means of Tradition is capable of this. In other words, "philosophy should begin with an act of faith in the primative truths received from Tradition through language or the consent of all men."[15]

A clearer indication of what the Council intended on this point can be obtained from the words of Bishop Vincent Gasser,[16] spokesman for the Deputation for the Faith in answering several charges that had been suggested.[17] He distinguishes two planes of Traditionalist thought. The adherents (he calls them "fideistae") of "traditionalismus crudior" hold that a *rational* proof for God's existence *must be preceded* by the acceptance of His existence on *Divine* Faith, whereas the adherents of "traditionalismus mitior" maintain that it suffices if this idea of God be obtained from human society – at least proximately.[18]

After establishing this distinction he states unequivocally:

> The doctrine of the "traditionalismus crudior" is most certainly to be damned, as it has been already.[19] For by this teaching certitude about God's existence, the very foundation of our Faith, is torn asunder. And for our times this matter is of especially of the greatest importance.[20]

On this point, then, there is do doubt in the mind of the Church.

The Deputation for the Faith also recognized that "traditionalismus mitior" contained many dangerous principles, and that it could not be taught with safety. Consequently, the spokesman, in the name of the Deputation, urged the Council to reject two amendments[21] which appeared to aid this diluted form of Traditionalism.

After reviewing the nature of the two Traditionalist schools and their particular dangers, the spokesman asked whether the statement in the

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[15] ". . . la philosophie doit commencer par un acte de foi aux vérités primitives, recues de la Tradition par le language ou le consentement de tous." *Ibid.*, p. 684.

[16] Bishop Gasser was selected for the difficult task of presenting to the Council the recommendations of the *Deputatio de Fide.* On July 11th 1870, he reviewed the whole question of Papal Infallibility before the assembled council in a speech lasting some four hours. Dom Butler points out that "Mgr. Vincent Gasser, Prince-Bishop of Brixen, Austrian Tyrol, stands out as the most prominent theologian of the Council." (*op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 134.) From henceforth in this paper, unless it is otherwise indicated, the words "spokesman" or "representative of the *Deputatio de Fide*" refers to Bishop Gasser.

[17] *Lac.*, 120d-121a, emendationes nn. 3, 4 & 8.

[18] *Lac.*, 129c, d.

[19] For example, the condemnation of the system of Lamennais by Pope Gregory XVI in 1832 and 1834. Cf. J. M. A. Vacant, *Etudes Theologique sur les Constitutions du Concile du Vatican*, (Paris: Delhomme et Briguet, 1895), tome 1, p. 144.

[20] "Doctrina traditionalismi crudioris certe omnino est damnanda, sicut jam damnata est: nam per talem doctrinam evellitur ipsum fundamentum fidei nostrae, certitudo de existentia Dei; et pro nostris imprimis temporibus res ista summi momenti est." *"Lac.*, 130a, b.

[21] *Lac.*, 131c.

canon and in the chapter really placed a limit to these two errors. The answer is affirmative – *if* the doctrine of the chapter is taken "in its native rigor."[22] This was another reason why no alteration was desirable, lest the natural meaning and force of the words be weakened.

From all this it can be concluded that the Council intended to safeguard the fundamental truth that God's existence can be known certainly by human reason from created things. In stating this as a principle not only did "traditionalismus crudior" stand directly condemned but, by an indirect censure, "traditionalismus mitior" as well.[23] Although the representative of the Deputation for the Faith considered this fundamental principle to be opposed to Traditionalism in general,[24] the possibility of attaining any other natural truth by the natural light of human reason is not considered in this canon. The possibility is denied in various degrees by Traditionalists depending upon their particular tenets. This may be cited as an example of the Church's practice of stating only what is necessary in order to condemn an error or to defend a truth.

Included in the purview of the Council's condemnation is another error, in some ways more basic, but which appears under a multitude of disguises making classification difficult. Substantially, it is the proposition that God's existence cannot be known in any manner with certitude by human reason.[25] This tenet obviously is held by Atheists who deny God's existence altogether, and by the Positivists, whose cardinal principle states that the only legitimate avenue to truth is by way of empirical demonstration.[26]

Practically speaking, however, no discussion revolved around these two errors. If the number of suggested amendments and the length of the answers given by the official spokesman be taken as the measure of their importance, quite clearly the Church was more concerned over those within Her fold – the Catholic Traditionalists – than over those outside Her jurisdiction – the Atheists and most Positivists. Consequently, there is no need for a detailed consideration of the defined truth in relation to these positions. It will suffice to point out that these errors were also condemned by several other canons in the same Constitution.[27]

Having examined the erroneous doctrines aimed at by the Council in formulating this definition, the next step will be a closer inspection of the definition itself. For the sake of simplification and clarity five principal elements can be distinguished in the canon:

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[22] *Ibid.*, 131a, b.

[23] *Ibid.*, 130d-131a.

[24] Cf. *Ibid.*, 79c; Also Cf. "Ainsi soutenir, avec les athées et les positivists, qu'il n'est aucun moyen pour nous de connaitre Dieu . . . est hérétique." Vacant, *op. cit.*, p. 287; *ibid.*, p. 301.

[25] *Lac.*, 130d.

[26] Thonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 522; Parente, et al, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

[27] For example; "Si quis unum verum Deum visibilium et invisibilium creatorem et Dominum negaverit: anathema sit." De Deo rerum omnium creatore, Can. 1, *Lac.*, 255a; Denz. 1801.

1) the object to be known,
2) the efficient cause of this knowledge,
3) the source of this knowledge,
4) the certitude of this knowledge, and
5) the possibility of this knowledge.[28]

Each will be examined in turn.

The first element, then, consists in the object to be known, namely, God. The canon states simply that it is the "one true God our Creator and Lord."[29] How is this expression to be understood? At first glance there would seem to be no difficulty. Yet the assembled Prelates were soon taking objection to one or another part of what appears to be a simple and straightforward statement.

A comparison with the pertinent phrase in the corresponding chapter will help throw some light on its meaning: ". . . God, the beginning and end of all things . . ."[30] The same wording will be found in the Oath against Modernism of Pius X,[31] required of those to be ordained to the Subdiaconate, Confessors, Preachers, Pastors, Professors in a Seminary, etc.[32] If the two phrases are juxtaposed – "Creator and Lord," "beginning and end" – the idea of God as the efficient and final cause of all things is set in relief. This shoulders man with the responsibility of recognizing God as his Maker and as his destiny.

It was suggested by one of the Fathers that the words of Saint Paul be added: "And so they are without excuse, seeing that, although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks . . ."[33] The reason for the proposed change, apparently, was to make it clear that knowledge of God should not be limited to just a speculative grasp but should also be extended to the principal moral obligations. The answer given by the representative of the Deputation for the Faith was that such a modification would be superfluous, inasmuch as to know God, the beginning and end of all things, is to recognize also the chief moral duties of man towards God.[34]

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[28] R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *God, His Existence and Nature,* (trans. by Dom B. Rose, St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1934), p. 19; cf. Vacant, *op. cit.,* tome I, p. 287.

[29] "Deum unum et verum, creatorem et Dominum nostrum." *Lac.,* 255c; Denz. 1806.

[30] ". . . Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem . . ." *Lac.,* 250d; Denz. 1785.

[31] "Ego . . . firmiter amplector ac recipio omnia et singula, quae ab inerranti Ecclesiae magisterio definita, adserta ac declarata sunt, praesertim ea doctrinae capita, quae hujus temporis erroribus directo adversantur. Ac primum quidem: Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali rationis lumine *per ea quae facta sunt* (Cf. Rom. 1:20), hoc est, per *visibilia* creationis opera, tamquam causam per effectus, certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse, profiteor." Denz. 2145.

[32] Cf. T. L. Bouscaren, S.J., and A. C. Ellis, S.J., *Canon Law: A Text and Commentary,* (2nd Rev. ed., Milwaukee: Bruce Publ. Co., 1953), p. 792.

[33] Rom. 1:21.

[34] Thus Bishop Gasser points this recognition of moral responsibility is incumbent upon man. "Sed sub hoc aspectu emendatio ista superflua videtur, quia quum dicimus posse hominem cognoscere Deum rerum omnium principium et finem, utique etiam simul enuntiamus, posse hominem intelligere et cognoscere officia principaliora moralia: nam nemo potest tendere in Deum tamquam finem suum utique naturalem qua auctorem naturae, nisi etiam cognoscat officia saltem principaliora erga Deum." *Lac.,* 133a; Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.,* vol. 1, p. 14.

As helpful as all this is, it is still insufficient to make it absolutely clear just what knowledge of God the natural light of human reason is capable of. It is necessary, therefore, to examine the other degrees in this same Constitution which shed more light on the question.

Five canons are concerned with God, the creator of all things.[35] The first three enunciate the following truths: the one true God is creator of all visible and invisible things; there is something existing besides matter; God is distinct from all other things. According to the preliminary instructions delivered by Archbishop Simor to the Conciliar Fathers in the name of the Deputation, these three canons are respectively directed against all errors about God's existence – against the materialists, the pantheists and the ontologists.[36] All these are errors concerning truths within the ambit of human reason.

An examination of the part of the first chapter corresponding to the three canons just mentioned reveals a more detailed picture of the one true God.

> The Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman Church believes and confesses that there is one true and living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, Almighty, Eternal, Immense, Incomprehensible, Infinite, in intellect, in will, and in all perfection; who, as being one, sole, absolutely simple and immutable spiritual substance, is to be declared as really and essentially distinct from the world, of supreme beatitude in and from Himself, and ineffably exalted above all things which exist, or are conceivable, except Himself.[37]

The significant point here is not so much the enumeration of the divine attributes but their mode of existence, namely, that they are infinite. That reason can attain to the infinity of God had already been proposed in a formula to which Bautain, a Traditionalist, was required to subscribe in 1840: "Reason can with certainty prove the existence of God and the infinity of His perfections."[38] Although the Vatican Council does not define this last point, i.e., the capacity of reason to prove the infinity of God's perfections, it seems to be implicitly contained in the definition when the other parts of the Constitution are taken into consideration.

Furthermore, in his opening remarks, before analyzing each of the proposed changes one by one, the spokesman for the Deputation for the Faith states that the method which is being followed in this schema first considers God as He is in Himself, then as He is distinct from all others. These divine attributes, the spokesman went on to say, are what

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[35] *Lac.*, 255a, b; Cf. Denz. 1801-1805.

[36] *Lac.*, 86b.

[37] Butler, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 253-55; the Latin reads: "Sancta Catholica Apostolica Romana Ecclesia credit et confitetur, unum esse Deum verum et vivum, creatorem ac Dominum coeli et terrae omnipotentem, aeternum, immensum, incomprehensibilem, intellectu ac voluntate omnique perfectione infinitum; qui cum sit una singularis, simplex omnino et incommutabilis substantia spiritualis, praedicandus est re et essentia a mundo distinctus, in se et ex se beatissimus, et super omnia, quae praeter ipsum sunt et concipi possunt, ineffabiliter excelsus," *Lac.*, 250b. Cf. Denz. 1782.

[38] "Ratiocinatio potest cum certitudine probare existentiam Dei et infinitatem perfectionum ejus." Denz. 1622; Cf. Denz. 1650.

theologians call the constitutive of the divine essence.[39] In the mind of the Deputation, the attributes, as listed above, appear to be those which, after a manner of speaking, describe the "one true God" in terms of His physical essence,[40] and which lie within the range of the natural light, i.e., within the grasp of the human intellect.

The presence of the word "creator" in the canon of principal interest for this paper caused not a few of the Fathers some concern. Yet from the very outset of the deliberation, it was made abundantly clear that it was not the intention of the Council to define that creation *in its proper sense*, i.e., the act of God making all things from nothing, could be demonstrated by reason. The word "creator" is retained because Sacred Scripture[41] uses this term in the same context.[42]

Two changes submitted later asked that the canon be rephrased to bring it into closer conformity with the chapter. Thus the words "Our Creator and Lord" would be changed to "Creator and Lord of all things."[43] The Deputation for the Faith recommended a rejection of this proposed amendment because the words of the canon were taken from the famous passage in the Book of Wisdom, and it was desired to retain the same meaning of the word "creator" as it has in the Sacred Scripture.[44]

A difficulty from the opposite quarter arose when the suggestion was made that the canon be worded to read: "If anyone denies that God is Creator, etc." The answer said simply that the Deputation for the Faith had no intention of denying directly the ability to know God as Creator of all things by the natural light. It was admitted, nevertheless, that this proposition is in the canon in such a manner that it could be deduced from it.[45] And it seems, a fortiori, that the divine attributes also are in this defined truth in a "deducible" form.

Another proposed change, prompted by a desire to avoid any misunderstanding in so important a matter, would remove from the canon the expression, "our Creator and Lord."[46] The representative of the Deputation for the Faith recalled to the mind of the assembled Prelates

[39] *Lac.*, 102b, c.

[40] Cf. J. Gredt, *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, (7th ed., Friburg: Herder & Co., 1936), vol. 2, p. 205.

[41] "For by the greatness of the beauty, and the creature, the creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby." Wisdom, 13:5.

[42] In its preliminary observations on this canon the *Deputatio de Fide* said: "Etsi in canone legatur vocabulum creator; non ideo definitur, creationem proprie dictam ratione demonstrari posse; sed retinetur vocabulum, quo Scriptura hanc veritatem revelans utitur, nihil ad ejus sensum determinandum adjecto." *Lac.*, 79d.

[43] *Lac.*, 125c, emendationes 47, 48.

[44] "Ergo Deputatio nomen istud in sensu sacrae Scripturae simpliciter retineri vult; et proinde censet non adoptandam esse istam emendationem. Idem vult ex eadem causa de emendatione sequenti sub numero 48°." *Lac.*, 149b.

[45] "Sed fallitur rmus. auctor, cum putat eam fuisse mentem Deputationis hic definiendi, quod non solummodo existentia Dei lumine naturali cognosci possit, sed etiam directe definiendi, quod Deus sit creator omnium rerum: hoc utique non directe, sed solum illative in canone dicere voluimus." *Lac.*, 242d.

[46] *Lac.*, 229a, emendatio 98½.

that, while it is true that in the time of St. Bonaventure the question was much discussed whether the ancient pagan philosophers knew creation in its proper sense or not, still they all agreed that, at least, God, The Creator, could be known. Aristotle was more mistaken about the eternity of the world than about God's creation of the world. Nothwithstanding the possible objections to the use of the word "Creator" in the canon, the Deputation did not consider it licit to remove it when it is used in the Sacred Scriptures in connection with the same matter.[47] The Sacred Writer, in this famous passage, is castigating the idolaters for not being able to recognize the Creator from His works.

The "one true God, our Creator and Lord" of this canon is just that – nothing more, nothing less. Emphasis should be placed upon the notion of *true God*, the efficient and final cause of all things. His perfections exist in an infinite degree, and, while the Council did not define directly that God's attributes could be known by the natural light unaided, this idea, it seems safe to say, is virtually contained in the definition.[48] The whole tenor of the Constitution on the Catholic Faith indicates the Council's desire to exclude any vague concept of God which would admit of a pantheistic identification with the universe or of a deistic depersonalization.

The second element to be considered in this canon is the efficient cause of the natural knowledge we have of God, namely, "the natural light of human reason." Since other means of arriving at a natural knowledge of God's existence have been proposed, as for example, the "practical reason" of Kant, and the "conscience," "religious sense," or "religious experience" of the modernists,[49] it is necessary that the meaning of phrase "the natural light of human reason" be made clear as it was intended by the Council.

Although the Council nowhere states it explicity, the words under consideration plainly refer to man's natural faculty for perceiving truth.[50] Nor do any of the recorded remarks of the Conciliar Fathers or of their consulting theologians reveal the source of this particular phrase. Still there is no reason to doubt that this is what they meant. Finally, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the phrase, at least proximately, came from the writings of St. Thomas and the Schoolmen, who frequently employ very similar expressions. It is at least a plausible conjecture.

In the third chapter of this decree on the Catholic Faith the natural light of reason is contrasted, as a cause of knowledge, with that possessed on the authority of God:

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[47] *Lac.*, 243a, b.

[48] Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 14-17.

[49] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 17-18.

[50] As Vacant points out the tone of the subsequent chapters of the Constitution makes it clear that by the term "reason" the Council is concerned with a natural faculty for knowledge. He writes: "Dans la suite de notre Constitution, et en particulier au chapitre quatrième, qui est intitulé *de la foi et de la raison, de fide et ratione*, la raison est opposée à la foi. On y appelle raison, notre faculté naturalle de connaitre la vérité." (*op. cit.*, tome 1, p. 291).

> And the Catholic Church teaches that this faith, which is the beginning of man's salvation, is a supernatural virtue, whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which He has revealed are true; not because of the intrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself who reveals them . . .[51]

When assent is given to some truth because of the "intrinsic truth of things seen by the natural light of reason," the consent of the mind is based on the evidence of truth itself. The mind *sees* that the subject and predicate of a proposition really have the relationship indicated; there is a recognized correspondence between the concept in the intellect and the reality which it exprsses. It is not merely *true knowledge,* that is, a conformity of the mind to reality – which faith, human or divine, is also able to provide – but it is, in addition, *knowledge of the truth,* which is to know the reasons of the truth.[52] Only when the mind sees why this truth must be what it is and cannot be otherwise, can it be said that it has knowledge of the truth. By the natural light of human reason man *sees* for himself that the one true God exists.

The proposition to which Bautain had to subscribe has already been mentioned.[53] It enters again at this point because, in place of the phrase "natural light of human reason," it contains the word "ratiocination." This latter expression underlines more clearly the notion of the reasoning process; in fact it often signifies an *exact* piece of reasoning. This proposition antedates the Vatican Council by about thirty years. Forty years *after* the same Council the Oath against Modernism would be promulgated, teaching (in part) that God is known from created works by the natural light in the way that a cause [is known] from its effects.[54] Surely here is a clear and unequivocal statement that a true reasoning process is involved.

In the preliminary explanation of the decrees, the Deputation for the Faith asserted that the principle contained in the canon is denied if one holds that in spite of man's faculty for ratiocination, he cannot come to a certain knowledge of God without having first received a positive teaching concerning God.[55] This points up the fact that man has a power for knowing God, not in some indeterminate fashion or other, but in a particular way, namely, from creatures. Since God is not a creature, since He is not identified with creatures, the meaning of the phrase is that the human mind is capable of moving from these works of creation

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[51] Butler, *op. cit.,* vol. 1, p. 259. The Latin text reads: "Hanc vero fidem, quae humanae salutis initium est, Ecclesia catholica profitetur, virtutem esse supernaturalem, qua, Dei aspirante et adjuvante gratia, ab eo revelata vera esse credimus, non propter intrinsecam rerum veritatem naturali lumine perspectam, sed propter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelantis . . ." (*Lac.,* 251d; Denz. 1789).

[52] Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.,* p. 17.

[53] Cf. note 38, *supra.*

[54] Cf. note 31, *supra.*

[55] "Principium autem, quod statuitur, hoc est: in hominis natura rationali potentiam esse, Deum per res creatas certo cognoscendi. Jam vero qui diceret, fieri prorsus non posse, ut homo etsi expeditam habeat facultatem ratiocinandi, *sine positiva de Deo tradita,* ad Dei certam notitiam perveniat; is illud principium negaret." (*Lac.,* 79c)

to the Creator Himself, as from effects to their universal cause. Such a capacity is obviously not merely *passive,* one which could *receive* information; rather it is an *active* power for knowing God from creatures.[56]

It must be observed here that the canon does not say that the existence of God can be proved in the sense of *strict demonstration.* It says merely that His existence can be *known with certitude,* a slightly different thing. When the suggestion was made that the canon be amended to read, "may be known for certain *and demonstrated* by the natural light," the Deputation for the Faith rejected it on the grounds that the saying was too hard, even though "known for certain" and "demonstrated" are to some degree one and the same.[57] On the other hand, the canon does not deny that demonstration in the formal sense is possible. The intent of the Council seems to be to guarantee the absolute minimum.

This brief discussion is sufficient to make it apparent that the phrase, "the natural light of human reason," is to be understood in its obvious sense – at least, to those acquainted with the language of scholasticism. It refers to that natural faculty of man whereby he arrives at truth, proceeding from the more known to the less known in a process intrinsically independent of the testimony of other persons.

The next element of the canon to be considered is *the means* by which this knowledge of God is acquired, namely, created things. From our previous inquiries it is patent that the first rule of thumb to be followed in understanding these words is that they are to be taken in their natural sense, that is, in the sense conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the words.[58] Until there are positive reasons for a different interpretation, no alteration should be countenanced. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to examine the antecedent discussions in order to ascertain that no different meaning was intended.

The principal difficulty in regard to this point, apparently, stems from Cartesianism, which holds for an innate idea of God in man.[59] Created things act as occasions or reminders which, as it were, awaken the idea of God slumbering in our minds. If it be permissible to stretch the ordinary meaning of words – almost to the point of distortion – room can be made for the Cartesian viewpoint in this canon.

Yet the evident intention of the Church seems to be to the contrary. First of all, the actual words in the canon, in its Latin form, are plagi-

[56] Bishop Gasser in his report to the Council on the Second Chapter states with reference to the meaning of the first paragraph that this power in man is not merely passive but active. "Jam quod attinet ad cognitionem Dei naturalem in paragrapho 1° haec dicimus, scilicet homini inesse potentiam et quidem non mere passivam sed activam ad Deum cognoscendum, et ideo, quod idem est, homini inesse vires ad Deum cognoscendum . . ." (*Lac.,* 127d.)

[57] "Quamvis aliquatenus *certo cognoscere* et *demonstrare* sit unum idemque, tamen phrasim mitiorem Deputatio de Fide eligendam censuit, et non istam duriorem." (*Lac.,* 132c.)

[58] Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.,* p. 19.

[59] *Ibid.,* pp. 18-19.

arized – so to speak – from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans: *per ea quae facta sunt,* which the English renders as: "through those things that are made."[60] The corresponding chapter has, in apposition to the words of St. Paul, the phrase: "by means of created things."

The additions already cited from the Oath against Modernism assume a special significance here: ". . . by means of those things which are made, that is, through the visible works of creation, as a cause [is known] from its effects."[61] The presence of the word "visible" underscores the role of the sensible universe in our knowledge of God and at the same time relates these creatures to the concept of a natural *light.*

More important, it seems, are the last words of that extract: "as a cause [ is known] from its effects." This removes the whole discussion from the domain of Cartesianism, which interprets the canon, mentioned above, as teaching that created things serve as an occasion for man's natural knowledge of God. To know one thing as the cause of other things is really a causal, not an occasional, knowledge. But an extreme is to be avoided here. For it is not a question of knowing God *precisely* as a cause of creation, but *after a manner* of such knowledge.

Furthermore, the position that the mind proceeds from creatures to God, after the fashion of the motion from effects to cause, finds support in a subsequent phrase in the Oath, namely, ". . . is able to be known and even demonstrated."[62] Hence this Oath reaffirms, with added emphasis, the radical ability of the human mind to make the journey from creation to God successfully. Thus, the conclusion may be drawn that the principle of causality is of transcendental value, and not limited to the physical, created order.[63] From material and finite beings the human mind, applying the principle of causality, at least *in actu exercito,* is able to ascend without hesitation to the Infinite Being.

On the other hand, it must be observed that the Council has no intention of *limiting* our natural knowledge of God to proofs arising *only* from the sensible world. When one objector wanted to make this point explicit in the chapter with the words: ". . . God can be known for certain by the natural light of human reason, that is, by metaphysical, cosmological, and moral arguments," the spokesman of the Deputation for the Faith countered by stating that this objection was based on an entirely false presumption. On the contrary, the doctrine of the chapter *includes* these various arguments, for if creatures below man bear the stamp of their creator, all the more does man carry the divine seal.[64] So, from man's spiritual composition and from his moral actions, God's existence may be known.

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[60] 1:20.
[61] Cf. note 31, *supra.*
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.,* vol. 1, p. 20; Vacant, *op. cit.,* tome 1, pp. 324-25.
[64] *Lac.* 132a.

The ontological proof of St. Anselm received special treatment. Briefly, this proof is as follows:

> We define God as a being than which nothing greater can be thought. Now, there is in the mind the idea of such a being. But such a being must exist outside the mind; for if it did not, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought. Therefore, God exists not only in the mind, as an idea, but also outside the mind, as a reality.[65]

St. Thomas rejected this proof on the grounds that it involved an illicit transfer from the ideal to the real order.[66] The only valid conclusion of this argument is that *if* such a being exists, then he exists necessarily. With reference to this famous proof, the spokesman for the Deputation for the Faith satisfied himself with the remark, "who among us, in confirming by his vote the doctrine contained in this proposition, thinks of condemning the famous argument of St. Anselm, no matter what his private opinion of the same may be?"[67]

Another suggested alteration, similar to the above, wanted to add to the canon the words: "by man made to His image and likeness." This, too, was rejected, because the canon is not concerned with giving reasons but only with the condemnation of error. Admittedly a good reason, it is, nevertheless, out of place here.[68]

The fourth element in the canon is the *mode* of this knowledge, namely, that it is certain. Certitude is the state of mind by which it firmly adheres to one part of a contradiction without fear of the other part being true.[69] In view of the all-pervading scepticism of the modern age, which includes the period of the Vatican Council, it is not too strange that this particular element of the dogma raised not a few objections. These difficulties hinged directly or indirectly on the alleged fact that none of the pagan philosophers ever attained to a state of certitude in regard to God's existence. Consequently, so argued the objectors, the word "certo" should be expunged.

The principal argument against the inclusion of this critical word may be taken as representative. It states that it is one thing to say that the existence of God and His attributes can be known from creatures, and it is quite another thing to say that *reason* can know God with certitude as the Principle and End of all thing. None of the pagan philosophers – not even Aristotle, Plato, or Cicero, who perhaps represent the apogee of human intellectual power – were able to know God, the Principle and End of all things with certitude. Even after the promulga-

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[65] Wm. Turner, *History of Philosophy*, (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1929), p. 275.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 276; Cf. *Summa Theol.*, Ia, Q. 2, a. 1, ad 2.
[67] "Quis enim nostrum, cum hanc doctrinam, quae a nobis proponitur, suo suffragio confirmaverit, quis putat ea damnare argumentum illud celeberrimum ontologicum s. Anselmi, quidquid hoc de argumento sentiat?" (*Lac.*, 132b.)
[68] Relative to this point Bishop Gasser said: "Sed quamvis ea ratio sit optima, tamen Deputatio censet istam emendationem non esse admittendam, ideo quia solemne est Ecclesiae in canonibus rationes non adducere, sed simpliciter errorem verbis definitis condemnare." (*Lac.*, 149d.)
[69] Cf. Gredt, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 52.

tion of Christianity, the pagan philosophers were not able to reach certainty in this matter. Therefore, concludes the objector, the word "certo" should be removed from the canon.[70]

Another objection, while admitting the truth of the principle, would delete the word because it does not appear clearly or certainly enough revealed to constitute suitable matter for definition.[71] The remainder of the objections were content merely to request the removal of the offensive word from the canon without offering any reasons for such a suggestion. Presumably the same reason underlay these as that put forth in the first of this group.

The spokesman of the Deputation for the Faith took great care in answering these objection, spending more time on them than on any so far considered. He pointed out that, notwithstanding his previous insistence upon the fact that man *in genere* was under consideration, the rejoinder remained in direct opposition to that thesis. It asserts, in effect, that, even granted the existence of such a power in man, once reduced to act, it would still remain uncertain and ought rather to be called an *impotency.* The Deputation answered this charge by *denying* flatly the claim that no philosopher whatever knows God, the Beginning and End of all things, with certainty.[72]

He then went on to say that in the small library which he had been able to collect in Rome, he could find matter to counter the objection. The Greek scholia of Aristotle's *Physics* and the *Eudemian Ethics,* although not written by Aristotle himself, could be cited as examples. The former is the work of a Greek commentator on Aristotle, and the latter was written by Eudemus of Rhodes, a disciple of the Stagirite. The Greek scholiast, or commentator on the *Physics* of Aristotle, states that, in that work, Aristotle teaches the conclusion that God is not only the final cause of the earth and of the heavens but also the efficient cause.[73]

Thus it appears that the Greek scholiast himself recognized very well what Aristotle had succeeded in doing. But the spokesman did not rest his case upon this one piece of evidence. Taking up the *Eudemian Ethics,* he notes that, according to the mind of Aristotle:

> . . . all virtues of man whether intellectual or moral are referred to God, indeed the intellectual are directed to the contemplation of God, but the moral to the worship of God. Who, seeing these things, can deny that Aristotle knew God, the Beginning and End of all things with certitude?[74]

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[70] *Lac.,* 224c-225a, emendatio n. 51.

[71] *Ibid.,* emendatio n. 52½.

[72] "Sed mitto majorem et nego minorem, scilicet quod nullus umquam philosophorum Deum omnium rerum principium et finem certo cognoverit." (*Lac.,* 236d.)

[73] "Jam quid videtur in his scholis et in his Ethicis? Scholiastes graecus ad finem Physicorum Aristotelis haec verba adjicit, et peto, Rmi. Patres, ut ea bene notetis. Dicit omnia quae Aristoteles in libris Physicorum habet, eo tendere ut doceat Deum esse mundi et etiam coeli causam non solummodo finalem sed etiam efficientem." (*Lac.,* 237a.)

[74] "Ergo juxta Aristotelem, omnes virtutes hominis tum intellectuales tum morales referuntur ad Deum; et quidem intellectuales referuntur ad contemplationem Dei, morales vero ad cultum Dei. Quis haec intuendo negare poterit, Aristotelem cognovisse certo Deum omnium principium et finem?" (*Lac.,* 237c, d.)

It is not recorded whether or not anyone stood up to answer his rhetorical question.

With regard to Plato, "it is well known that he places the end of man in the imitation of God to the extent possible."[75] Although, for the most part, this knowledge was purely speculative and did not improve morals, it is nonetheless true that such men knew of the existence of the true God. This is supported by the words of Saint Paul treating of the natural knowledge which men have of God: "And so they are without excuse, seeing that, although they knew God, they did not glorify him as God or give thanks, but became vain in their reasonings."[76]

There is, therefore, no reason to deny the principle under discussion, since, in at least two instances, pagan philosophers have arrived at certitude in their knowledge of God's existence. This capacity in man is a real power, for, as history testifies, it has actually been reduced to act in several certified cases. Without doubt others have been successful as well but without leaving the evidence of historical testimony to us.

The fifth and last element of the definition is concerned with the possibility of this knowledge. From the very beginning of the Council, the annotations provided by the staff of consulting theologians had made it abundantly clear that it was not a question of every individual man having obtained his first knowledge of God's existence from the natural universe about him. Rather what is intended and what is patently affirmed by Scripture is that man does have the *capacity* to know God from creatures. The capacity is such that, in the absence of other channels, there remains the natural obligation for man to acquire the necessary knowledge by this mean.[77]

This analysis was reinforced by several other statements. The representative of the Deputation for the Faith remarked, before his consideration of the several amendments, that the phrase "the natural light of human reason from created things" simply means that sufficient means are available to man in the natural order for him to attain to a knowledge of God the Beginning and End of all things.[78] No reason is given for the conclusion, but it is the meaning given to the expression as voted upon by the Conciliar Fathers and later promulgated with the approval of the Pope. Hence there can be no question of its truth. That this was really the meaning attached to the expression will be evident from a consideration of the subsequent objections and the answer given by the Deputation.

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[75] *Lac.*, 237d.

[76] Rom. 1:21.

[77] In the explicatory notes provided by the consulting theologians the same idea is brought forth. ". . . sed id de quo agitur, et quod Scripturae immediate affirmant, est *potentia* rationis: quod nimirum objectiva Dei per creaturas manifestatio ordinatur ad humanam rationem, et huic insunt vires, ut *possit* ex illa manifestatione Deum cognoscere. Ex quo utique consequitur naturalis obligatio pro homine per hanc manifestationem, si alia praesidia desint, perveniendi ad cognitionem Dei, quod quidem a S. Paulo et in libro Sap. 11. cc. docetur diserte." (*Lac.*, 520c.)

[78] *Lac.*, 127d

One objector to this phrase wanted to delete the word "natural" because man is not, nor was he ever, in a merely natural state. To this objection the answer of the Deputation for the Faith was that "the most reverend author of this suggestion had confused two things which should not be confused, namely, the principles (or capacity) of reason and the exercise of reason."[79] The consideration here was precisely with the principles of reason, not with their exercise. Furthermore, man in virtue of his being a rational creature, is endowed with the principles of reason by which he can have knowledge of God from creatures with certainty. In other words, this light is natural because it pertains to his nature as rational.

Another suggested amendment desired to modify the expression to make it apply to the present state of man. This suggestion met with no more favor than the previous ones. The doctrine of the canon and of the corresponding chapter is concerned with man in whatever state he may be found, either now or before, in a state of pure or of fallen nature.[80] The canon says nothing about the *actual exercise* of this power, nor does it consider whether or not any particular institution is necessary for the actualization of this capacity. It merely affirms the reality of this natural power in man.

The foregoing discussion has attempted to clarify and to place the meaning of this important canon beyond reasonable doubt. The Conciliar Fathers were primarily interested in stating a truth revealed by God beyond cavil, namely, that man in virtue of his rational nature has the natural ability to know God, with absolute certainty, as He is revealed to him in creation. This is a true knowledge of the true God, a knowledge of Him as He is distinct from creation and infinitely perfect in Himself.[81] It is not, however, incumbent upon each man to know

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[79] "Sed, Rmi, Patres, mihi videtur rmus auctor hujus exceptionis confundere duo, quae non sunt confundenda, scilicet principia rationis et exercitium rationis." And he adds "Nos solummodo loquimur de principiis rationis, quod Deus ex principiis rationis certo cognosci possit; quidquid sit de exercitio rationis." (*Lac.*, 238b.)

[80] This point was underlined by Bishop Gasser's answer to the objector who wanted to word the chapter so as to apply to man in his present condition. "Sed etiam haec emendatio non placuit Deputationi fidei, et quidem ex causa, quia jam semel erat in schemate reformato et studio iterum deletum est, 'ut nunc est'; cum ea quae in ista doctrina docentur, generatim vera habenda sint, sive sumatur homo in statu naturae purae, sive in statu naturae lapsae." (*Lac.*, 131c, d.)

[81] Vacant (*op. cit.*, tome 1, pp. 308-309.) holds that whereas it is a dogma of Faith, by virtue of this canon, that natural human reason can know the true God, it is *not* a defined dogma that it can know the unity of God, the true nature of God, and the mystery of creation *ex nihilo*. But he does admit, in effect, that these truths are *theologically certain* because the corresponding chapter teaches that God can be known as the beginning and end of all things. Now this very point is contained, as has been mentioned above, in the Oath against Modernism in connection with the truth already defined by the Vatican Council. Furthermore, Bishop Gasser stated that the notion of creator in the proper sense of the word is in the canon in a deducible form. (Cf. note n, 45, *supra.*) It would seem to follow that these truths, *theologically certain* from the chapter, are contained *virtually* in the canon. But are they then *defined* by virtue of the canon? This remains an open question. Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 14-17.

God in the mirror of His creation; it suffices, where other means are lacking, that man with his natural equipment *be able* to arrive at this truth. In addition, the truth of God's existence obtained in this manner need not be the result of a rigorous demonstration – although this is possible – for man can conclude correctly from effects to their cause by arguments out of form, like those which occur in everyday life. Finally, this knowledge is certain, that is, the mind is set at rest, for it has arrived at the truth without fear of its contradictory being true. Well has the Psalmist written: "The *fool* says in his heart: there is no God."[82]

Albert Moraczewski, O.P.

[82] Psalm 13:1; 52:1 (emphasis added.)

# CHRONICLE

On May 27, at the Loras College Chapel of Christ the King, His Excellency, the Most Reverend Loras T. Lane, D.D., Auxiliary Bishop of Dubuque, ordained to the Holy Priesthood the Reverends Albert Moraczewski, O.P., Peter Dunne, O.P., Ambrose Windbacher, O.P., Augustine Bordenkircher, O.P., Damian Fandal, O.P., Ferrer Pieper, O.P., Francis Kelly, O.P., Thaddeus Coverdale, O.P., Christopher Kiesling, O.P., and Kevin O'Rourke, O.P.

The Most Reverend Henry P. Rohlman, D.D., Archbishop of Dubuque, officiated at the ground-breaking ceremonies held on June 4 at St. Rose of Lima Priory to mark the start of construction on the proposed new priory which will house the Theological Studium of the Province of St. Albert the Great. The Very Reverend E. L. Hughes, O.P., assisted Archbishop Rohlman during the ceremony. Representatives of other Dominican communities, and members of the clergy of the Archdiocese were also present.

The Very Reverend J. J. McDonald, O.P., professor of moral theology in the Theological Faculty at St. Rose Priory, represented the Province of St. Albert the Great at the recent celebration of the seventh centenary of the founding of the University of Salamanca in Spain. On this occasion Father McDonald delivered a paper on *The Progress of Thomistic Spiritual Theology in the United States.* At this same time, Father McDonald attended a meeting of the editors of Dominican spiritual reviews, at which he represented the editors of *Cross and Crown.* Father McDonald again represented the Province at the Congress of Directors of Confraternities of the Most Holy Rosary at Fatima in Portugal. At this meeting Father McDonald read a paper on *Canonical Problems of Confraternities of the Most Holy Rosary.*

The Very Reverend J. A. Driscoll, O.P., Prior of St. Rose, Dubuque, was the speaker at the Pontifical High Mass on April 3, at St. Mary's Church, Dubuque, during the Marian Pilgrimage to that church. His Excellency, the Most Reverend Leo Binz, D.D., Coadjutor Archbishop of Dubuque, was celebrant of the Mass. Superiors and heads of religious

houses of the area were present at the Mass. The sermon was broadcast by radio. Father Driscoll spoke on the *Divine Maternity of Mary.*

The Marian Discourses for the students at the Theological Faculty at St. Rose of Lima Priory, Dubuque, have proceeded as planned. Inaugurating these lectures on March 7, the Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Reverend L. B. Cunningham, O.P., professor of dogmatic theology, delivered a paper on *St. Thomas and Mariology.* On May 7, the Very Reverend J. R. Gillis, O.P., *Lector Primarius* of the Theological Faculty, gave the second lecture on *The Cult of Mary.* The Very Reverend A. A. Norton, O.P., Master of Studies of the Studium Generale and of the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy at River Forest, gave the lecture on May 14, entitled *Mary's Merit,* and on May 21, the Very Reverend R. T. A. Murphy, O.P., professor of Sacred Scripture at the Theological Faculty, delivered a lecture on the *Triumph of Mary Over Satan.*

At the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy at River Forest, separate Marian lectures were given each week throughout the past semester for the members of each of the three classes there. These lectures were delivered by the Very Reverend S. E. Carlson, O.P., Regent of Studies of the Province of St. Albert the Great; the Very Reverend J. W. Curran, O.P., former *Baccalaureus* of the Studium and Vice-President of the Faculty; and the Reverend P. G. Hinnebusch, O.P., Chaplain of Trinity High School, River Forest.

On March 7, the Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Very Reverend W. H. Kane, O.P., Professor of Philosophy at the Pontifical Faculty at River Forest, gave a special lecture to the students there entitled *St. Albert and Mariology.*

In addition to the Marian lectures for the students, the members of the Pontifical Faculty at River Forest conducted a series of twelve Marian discourses for the laity at St. Vincent Ferrer's Church, River Forest. On February 22, the Very Reverend G. R. Joubert, O.P., lectured on *Mary, the Mother of God.* On March 1, the Very Reverend J. S. Considine, O.P., spoke on *Prophecies Fulfilled.* The Reverend J. T. Bonee, O.P., gave the lecture on March 8, entitled *Conceived Without Sin.* On March 15, the Reverend R. A. Powell, O.P., lectured on *Joseph, the Just Man.* The Very Reverend P. M. Clancy, O.P., read a paper on March 22, entitled *Full of Grace.* On March 29, the Reverend R. J. Nogar, O.P., spoke on *Mary, Ever a Virgin.* On April 5, the Reverend M. J. Faraon, O.P., lectured on *Our Mother.* The Very Reverend W. H. Kane, O.P., delivered the lecture on April 12, entitled *Lady of Sorrows.* On April 19, the Very Reverend S. E. Carlson, O.P., lectured on the *Assumption into Heaven. Mediatrix of All Graces* was the subject of the talk delivered by the Reverend J. D. Corcoran, O.P., on April 26. On May 3, the Reverend J. E. O'Connell, O.P., lectured on the *Queen of Angels and Saints.* On May 10, the concluding lecture, entitled *Lourdes and Fatima,* was delivered by the Reverend B. M. Ashley, O.P.

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